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INTRODUCTION
The ICC is well known in international legal circles. Indeed, everyone
who knows anything about international law knows that the ICC is the
acronym for the International Criminal Court, the body charged with
prosecuting international crimes around the globe. Created in 2002, the
ICC was intended to “put an end to impunity” for the perpetrators of
international crimes” and to affirm “that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished.”1
Imagine, however, a world where the “ICC” instead was an acronym for
the International Compensation Court. That is, what if the ICC were a
body charged with providing financial reparations to victims of mass violence? What if, instead of devoting millions upon millions of dollars to
*
Cabell Professor of Law & Director, Human Security Law Center, William &
Mary Law School. I am grateful to Laura Appleman, Bruce Combs, Evan Criddle, Caroline
Davidson, Paul Diller, Jeffrey Dobbins, and Eric Kades for their comments on an earlier
draft.
1.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court preamble, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 38544 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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prosecuting those who commit international crimes, the international community used those resources to compensate victims of international
crimes?
Such a thought experiment probably seems fanciful largely because,
for the last two decades, criminal trials have occupied center stage in the
international community’s panoply of responses to mass atrocities. Certainly, it is well understood that a variety of transitional justice measures
serve a variety of valuable ends. Indeed, individuals and societies emerging from widespread repression and violence have so many needs that no
single post-conflict mechanism can address all of them; thus, it has become
customary to consider various transitional justice mechanisms to complement one another and to provide different but equally crucial benefits to
societies seeking to heal following mass atrocities.2
However, despite the recognition that a multipronged and holistic approach to post-conflict transitions offers optimal benefits, most international law scholars and policy makers nonetheless view criminal trials as
the centerpiece response to mass atrocities, the gold standard, if you will,
of transitional justice mechanisms.3 Yes, truth commissions may disseminate a richer, more nuanced history than that which emerges from a criminal trial.4 Yes, financial compensation may provide victims with tangible
2.
See CHRISTINE EVANS, THE RIGHT TO REPARATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR
VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICT 135–37 (2012); Pablo de Greiff, Introduction to THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 11 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006) [hereinafter de Greiff’s Introduction];
Pablo de Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra at 451,
461; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The New Landscape of Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1, 8 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Javier Mariezcurrena
eds., 2006); Jane E. Stromseth, Pursuing Accountability for Atrocities After Conflict: What
Impact on Building the Rule of Law? 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 251, 259–60 (2007); Anja SeibertFohr, Reconciliation Through Accountability, 9 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 555, 569 (2005).
3.
See MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3–6
(2007); Laurel Fletcher & Harvey Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair, 24 HUM. RTS. Q.
573, 577–79 (2002); Tom Syring, Truth Versus Justice: A Tale of Two Cities?, 12 INT’L LEGAL
THEORY 143, 208–09 (2006). See also Luc Huyse, Justice After Transition: On the Choices
Successor Elites Make in Dealing with the Past, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING
DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES, GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 337, 339–41
(Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995) (describing the need for post-transition trials).
4.

Martha Minow observes:

The task of making a full account of what happened, in light of the evidence obtained, requires a process of sifting and drafting that usually does not accompany a
trial. Putting narratives of distinct events together with the actions of different actors demands materials and the charge to look across cases and to connect the
stories of victims and offenders. Truth commissions undertake to write the history
of what happened as a central task. For judges at trials, such histories are the byproduct of particular moments of examining and cross-examining witnesses and
reviewing evidence about the responsibility of particular individuals.
MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GEMASS VIOLENCE 59–60 (1998). See also PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE
TRUTHS: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 29–30 (2002). But see Jaime E.
Malamud-Goti & Lucas Sebastián Grosman, Reparations and Civil Litigation: Compensation
for Human Rights Violations in Transitional Democracies, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARA-
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assistance crucial to rebuilding their shattered lives. But despite the established benefits of these measures, each of them, separately or together, are
considered to fall considerably short if they are not coupled with criminal
trials.5 When non-prosecutorial mechanisms are the only response, it is
believed, many important goals will not be attained,6 and there will exist
an untenable justice gap.7
It is largely for this reason that criminal prosecutions have become the
main focus of the international community—politically, ideologically, and
financially—following mass atrocities, and other responses, including reparations, occupy a less-important place. To be sure, modern international
criminal law emerged only two decades ago with the somewhat surprising
creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).
Other tribunals soon followed, however. The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) prosecuted atrocities occurring during that country’s brutal
civil war. The Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor (Special
Panels) prosecuted crimes committed in the aftermath of East Timor’s independence referendum. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) recently
began prosecuting those allegedly responsible for the assassination of Lebanese President Hariri and nearly two dozen others, and the call for criminal justice is so strong that it persists nearly forty years following the
brutal reign of the Khmer Rouge, as the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) race to prosecute the Khmer Rouge’s octogenarian leaders before they die of old age. Finally and most importantly—as noted at the outset—the international community looked to the
TIONS,

supra note 2, at 539, 552 (contending that judicial fact-finding can be more reliable
than truth-commission fact-finding because at trial “witnesses render their testimony under
oath and can be cross-examined,” and because trials are conducted pursuant to “a vast array
of procedural institutions devised to guarantee the fairness of the fact-finding process”).
5.
See AFGHANISTAN INDEP. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, A CALL FOR JUSTICE: A NATIONAL CONSULTATION ON PAST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN 18 (2005),
available at http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/47fdfad50.pdf (explaining that for many victims “a
transitional justice strategy without a criminal justice component is likely to be viewed as
unsatisfactory”) [hereinafter A CALL FOR JUSTICE].
6.

Yael Danieli, Massive Trauma and the Healing Role of Reparative Justice, in REPAVICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: SYSTEMS IN PLACE AND SYSTEMS IN THE MAKING 41, 45 (Carla Ferstman et al. eds., 2009) (citing
studies showing that victims’ wounds are not as likely to heal if their perpetrators are not
identified and punished for their crimes); Richard Goldstone, Living History Interview with
Judge Richard Goldstone, 5 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 373, 376 (1995) (“If there is
not justice, there is no hope of reconciliation or forgiveness . . . .”); Hassan B. Jallow, Justice
and the Rule of Law: A Global Perspective, 43 INT’L LAW. 77, 79 (2009) (“The consolidation
and maintenance of peace could not be achieved without judicially addressing the grievances
arising from the genocide.”). See generally Timothy William Waters, A Kind of Judgment:
Searching for Judicial Narratives After Death, 42 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 279, 285–87
(2010) (discussing the importance of post-conflict justice).
7.
See Amnesty Int’l, Amnesty International Report 2010: State of the World’s Human
Rights 11, 37 (2010) (bemoaning the continued failure to prosecute many atrocities), available at http://reliefweb.int/report/world/amnesty-international-report-2010-state-worlds-hu
man-rights.
RATIONS FOR
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future in 2002 to establish a permanent international criminal court with
prospective jurisdiction to prosecute those who commit international
crimes all over the globe.
Domestic courts likewise have become a locus for the prosecution of
international crimes. Courts throughout Europe and beyond have prosecuted Rwandans accused of participating in that country’s 1994 genocide,8
as well as alleged offenders from the states of the former Yugoslavia.9 Indeed, although recent efforts to expand the reach of universal jurisdiction
have largely been unsuccessful,10 human rights organizations continue to
initiate proceedings where they can11 and they continue to steadfastly
pressure governments to undertake prosecutions.12 In short, prosecutions
for international crimes now take place in more locations than ever before,

8.
See, e.g., R. v. Munyaneza, [2009] Q.C.C.S. 4865 (Can.); German Court Sentences
Rwandan Ex-mayor on Genocide Charges, DEUTSCHE WELLE, Feb. 18, 2014, available at
http://www.dw.de/german-court-sentences-rwandan-ex-mayor-on-genocide-charges/a-174395
54; Norway Jails Rwandan for 21 Years over Role in 1994 Genocide, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 14,
2013, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/14/norway-jails-rwandan-geno
cide.
9.
See Entscheidungen Des Hundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen [BGHST] [Federal
Court of Justice] Prosecutor v. Nikola Jorgić, April 30, 1999 (Ger.), available at http://www
.asser.nl/upload/documents/20120611T032623-Jorgic_Urteil_30-4-1999.pdf; Bayerisches
Oberstes Landesgericht [BayObLG] (Bavarian Higher Regional Court) Prosecutor v. Djajic,
May 23, 1997 (Ger.); Tribunal Militaire de Division 1 [Military Court Division] In re G, April
18, 1997 (Switz.).
10.
Spain enacted far-reaching legislation authorizing the exercise of universal jurisdiction over defendants with little connection to Spain. A. Hays Butler, The Growing Support
for Universal Jurisdiction in National Legislation, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL
COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 67, 73
(Stephen Macedo ed., 2004). On this basis, it initiated cases against approximately 100 suspects in Chile and Argentina, including Chilean General Augusto Pinochet. In addition, it
investigated the conduct of Chinese, American, Salvadoran, Congolese, Israeli, and Guatemalan defendants. BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 137 (2d ed. 2010), and thereby provoked great controversy. Consequently, in 2009, Spain sharply limited its universal jurisdiction law. See Máximo Langer, The
Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction: The Political Branches and the Transnational Prosecution of International Crimes, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 26 (2011). It introduced further restrictions in January 2014. Ashifa Kassam, ‘Superjudge’ Condemns International Justice Curbs,
THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 15, 2014, available at https://listserv.buffalo.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind14
02&L=JUSTWATCH-L&F=&S=&P=99939; cf. Steven R. Ratner, Belgium’s War Crimes
Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 888 (2003) (describing Belgium’s unsuccessful foray
into expansive universal jurisdiction); Franck Petit, Genocide: Electric Shock in Denmark,
INT’L JUST. TRIB. June 6, 2011, available at http://www.rnw.nl/international-justice/article/gen
ocide-electric-shock-denmark.
11.
See, e.g., Oberlandesgericht [OLGST] [Regional Appeal Court] Center for Constitutional Rights et al. v. Donald Rumsfeld et al., Apr. 21, 2009 (Ger.).
12.
See, e.g., Senegal War Crimes Court Starts Work on Habré Trial, AGENCE FRANCEPRESSE, Feb. 8, 2013 (noting that human rights activists pressured Senegal for many years
before it agreed to prosecute Hissene Habré, the former dictator of Chad who had resided in
Senegal for more than two decades).
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and international crimes are now routinely met by swift and insistent calls
for criminal prosecutions.13
On the one hand, it is easy to understand—indeed to celebrate—the
international community’s desire for criminal justice. As a retributive matter, perpetrators of mass atrocities unquestionably deserve criminal sanctions. Genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity visit
extraordinary harms on victims and their families—harms that destroy
lives and rupture communities, often for generations. The scope and sadistic brutality of many of these crimes scream out for the imposition of severe punishment. Thus, it is understandable that a post-conflict package
that does not include criminal trials might be seen to be woefully inadequate, a package that lacks a key ingredient.14
At the same time, recent scholarship has compellingly questioned the
ability of international trials to attain the long-term goals frequently attributed to them. Consequently, it is now a matter for debate whether criminal
trials are capable of deterring future atrocities,15 satisfying victims,16 or
advancing peace-building efforts following large-scale violence.17 Indeed,
as a result of this newfound skepticism, some scholars have called for a
diversification of transitional justice mechanisms.18 This Article makes a
significant contribution to that literature by suggesting that the international community consider shifting its focus to one particularly tangible
post-conflict response–financial reparations for victims.
What sort of change-of-focus should we consider? Certainly, if I were
to limit myself to suggesting that individuals and societies emerging from
13.
See, e.g., Vanessa Allen, UN Wants Leaders Brought to Justice for Atrocities,
DAILY MAIL, Feb. 17, 2014, available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2561201/
North-Korea-categorically-totally-rejects-U-N-human-rights-report-details-starved-prisoncamp-mothers-forced-drown-newborn-children.html; Peter Clottey, ICC Could Investigate
South Sudan Conflict After UN Resolution, VOICE OF AMERICA, Feb. 5, 2014, available at
http://www.voanews.com/content/icc-could-investigate-south-sudan-conflict-after-un-resolution/1845325.html; Nick Cumming-Bruce, New Inquiry on Sri Lanka Points to Possible War
Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/05/world/asia/
new-inquiry-on-sri-lanka-points-to-possible-war-crimes.html?_r=0; Paul Richter, U.N. Report
on Syria Gas Attack Fuels Calls for Assad’s Prosecution, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2013, available
at http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/17/world/la-fg-syria-accountability-20130918.
14.
Malamud-Goti & Grosman, supra note 4, at 557.
15.
See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6 MAX PLANCK
Y.B. U.N. L. 1, 8–11 (2002); Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals
Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777 (2006).
16.
DRUMBL, supra note 3, at 13, 42–44; ERIC STOVER, THE WITNESSES: WAR CRIMES
AND THE PROMISE OF JUSTICE IN THE HAGUE (2005).
17.
Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 3, at 580; Marie-Bénéedicte Dembour & Emily
Haslam, Silencing Hearings? Victim-Witnesses at War Crimes Trials, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 151
(2004).
18.
Mark Drumbl, for instance, advocates a shift from measures that are “narrowly
oriented to incarceration following liberal criminal trials” toward the inclusion of “meaningful restorative initiatives, indigenous values, qualified amnesties, reintegrative shaming, the
needs of victims, reparations, collective or foreign responsibilities, distributive justice or
pointed questions regarding the structural nature of violence.” DRUMBL, supra note 3, at
147. See also Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 3, at 625.
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violent conflict would benefit from a greater quantity and range of financial reparations, I would be making a patently uncontroversial suggestion.
Ideally, a host of mechanisms would be employed following an episode of
mass atrocity: offenders would be prosecuted, victims would be compensated, truth would be told, and a variety of other symbolic and tangible
measures would be undertaken to right to the maximum degree possible
the many wrongs that victims suffered. Consequently, my thesis would be
self-evident if I advanced only the obvious proposition that the international community should make greater efforts to compensate victims of
international crimes. Of course it should, and even the more empirically
grounded question of whether international community could do a better
job of compensating victims can almost certainly be answered in the
affirmative.
The problem, of course, is that the resources that the international
community can devote to transitional justice measures are necessarily limited, so some form of prioritization is required. Currently, as discussed
above, the international community prioritizes the prosecution of those
who commit international crimes. Prioritizing criminal justice may well be
normatively appropriate theoretically, and I am willing to postulate for
purposes of this Article that criminal trials are both normatively required
as a retributive matter and better able than other transitional justice mechanisms to advance the goals that the international community considers
most important. But even if we assume that prioritizing criminal justice is
normatively appropriate as a theoretical matter, it is appropriate as a practical matter only if the international tribunals can do a plausibly good job
of carrying out their day-to-day business: prosecuting offenders.19
Whether they can is a question that Part I explores. It does so by considering three grave challenges confronting international tribunals. First,
international tribunals often find it tremendously difficult, if not impossible, to obtain custody over their indictees. Second, even when a tribunal
does get its defendants in the dock, it will often have considerable difficulty finding accurate facts about the crimes those defendants are alleged
to have committed. Both of these obstacles are in some sense prosaic;
however, each has the capacity to fundamentally undermine the tribunals’
ability to carry out their primary functions. Finally, even if we assume
(contrary to considerable evidence) that the international tribunals can
gain custody over a sufficient proportion of their indictees and can find
sufficiently accurate facts about the crimes in question, the cost of international trials is so high that only a small proportion of offenders can be
prosecuted. This necessary selectivity has the potential to further reduce
both the retributive and consequentialist benefits provided by international criminal trials.
The challenges facing international criminal tribunals are sufficiently
grave that one might wonder if the international community has been too
19.
I focus on international tribunals, but my analysis applies in very similar ways to
domestic courts that prosecute international crimes pursuant to universal jurisdiction.
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ambitious in its ostensible quest for international criminal justice. This
question is difficult to answer without assessing the international community’s ability to implement other post-conflict measures.
To that end, Part II considers one important and respected transitional
justice mechanism–financial reparations–and it evaluates the international
community’s capacity to provide them to victims. One thing we know
without further investigation is that obtaining the resources necessary to
adequately compensate victims would be impossible. Mass atrocities typically give rise to massive numbers of victims who sustain massive physical
and emotional injuries. Many such injuries cannot be “repaired” in any
meaningful sense of that term, and even providing non-trivial aid often
will be prohibitively expensive given the number of victims and the scale
of the losses. Reparatory efforts, therefore, necessarily will be inadequate
in an absolute sense.20 Part II’s primary focus, by contrast, is on relative
adequacy; in particular, it asks whether the international community can
more effectively compensate victims than it has been able to criminally
prosecute offenders. Although no one can answer this question with certainty, Part II generates a cautious and qualified “yes.”
Part III considers the implications of that conclusion. One possibility
is that there are no useful implications because the comparison itself is not
useful. That is, the fact that one post-conflict mechanism can be implemented more efficaciously than another is relevant only if the two mechanisms are equally valuable. But if, as we have postulated, prosecutions are
more valuable than other post-conflict mechanisms, then our only task is
to figure out how to improve prosecutions so as to overcome the neardisabling challenges that they currently confront.
The above analysis is valid, however, only if it is possible to substantially improve prosecutions at this point in time. An alternative conclusion,
and one that Part III presents, is that the challenges confronting international prosecutions are sufficiently grave, and the short-term prospects for
substantial improvement are sufficiently grim, that we should consider
temporarily shifting focus to another highly beneficial post-conflict mechanism that we are more capable of implementing. In Part III, I cautiously
suggest that, for the immediate future, we may be better off pursuing less
ambitious goals, such as reparations, that we are more likely to achieve
rather than continuing to aim for the gold standard of prosecutions, knowing that our current capacity to carry out prosecutions satisfactorily is
quite limited. In doing so, I detail both the benefits of the less-ambitious
goals as well as the corrosive effects of continuing to aim for–and failing to
achieve–the more ambitious agenda.

20.
Lisa J. Laplante & Kimberly Theidon, Truth with Consequences: Justice and Reparations in Post-Truth Commission Peru, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 228, 245 (2007) (noting that “economic reparations in the case of massive human rights violations can usually at most be a
modest amount that cannot truly indemnify the personal harm suffered from political violence,” but that reparations may have at least symbolic value to victims).
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I. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS:
THREE KEY CHALLENGES
The international community’s first foray into criminal trials–at Nuremberg and Tokyo following World War II–raised expectations that the
promulgation of international prohibitions could deter the kinds of atrocities perpetrated during World War II and that international criminal prosecutions were a potent response to such conduct when it did occur.
Consequently, states came together to conclude the Genocide Convention
and the Geneva Conventions,21 and the International Law Commission
began drafting both a comprehensive code of international crimes22 and a
statute establishing a permanent international criminal court.23 The Cold
War derailed these codification efforts,24 and so it was not until the Cold
War ended that modern international criminal law emerged. When it
did–with the creation of the ICTY and the ICTR–it was greeted with intense enthusiasm. Richard Goldstone, the first prosecutor of the ICTY
and ICTR, deemed those tribunals “a tremendous and exciting step forward,”25 while Payam Akhavan lauded them for radically departing from
“the traditional realpolitik paradigm which has so often and for so long
ignored the victims of mass murder and legitimized the rule of tyrants in
the name of promoting the purported summum bonum of stability.”26
Other commentators expressed similarly effusive views.27
21.
See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
22.
Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 6th Sess., June 3–July 28, 1954, U.N. Doc. A/2693;
GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 9 (1954), reprinted in [1954] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 140.
23.
Rep. of the Comm’n on Int’l Criminal Court Jurisdiction, 3rd Sess., Aug. 1–Aug.
31, 1951, U.N. Doc. A/2136; GAOR Supp. No. 11, ¶¶ 21–25 (1952).
24.
See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Time Has Come for an International Criminal Court,
1 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (1991).
25.
Richard Goldstone, Conference Luncheon Address, 7 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1, 2 (1997).
26.
Payam Akhavan, Justice and Reconciliation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa:
The Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 7 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 325, 327 (1997).
27.
See e.g., The Secretary General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, delivered to the Security Council, ¶ 39, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616
(Aug. 23, 2004); Richard J. Goldstone, 50 Years after Nuremberg: A New International Criminal Tribunal for Human Rights Criminals, in CONTEMPORARY GENOCIDES: CAUSES, CASES,
CONSEQUENCES 215, 215–16 (Albert J. Jongman ed., 1996); Richard May & Marieke Wierda,
Evidence Before the ICTY, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF
GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD 249, 252–53 (Richard May et al. eds., 2001); MINOW, supra
note 4, at 40; RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 56 (2000); Antonio Cassese, On the
Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of International
Humanitarian Law, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 2, 9–10 (1998); Antonio Cassese, Reflections on Inter-
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In the intervening years, criminal trials have unquestionably become
the international community’s centerpiece response to mass atrocities. As
noted in the introduction, the international community created a series of
ad hoc tribunals and a permanent international criminal court, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) encourage domestic
courts to undertake complex prosecutions on the basis of universal jurisdiction, and the prevailing view is that perpetrators of international crimes
must be criminally punished or justice has not been done. The international community has reinforced this view by bestowing massive resources
on the international tribunals. By 2013, the ICC, ICTY, ICTR, SCSL,
ECCC, and the STL had spent a whopping $6 billion28 to prosecute a
mere 285 defendants.29 Whether those resources can be considered wellspent depends on a variety of considerations, but one of the most crucial is
whether the international tribunals can carry out their prosecutions in a
satisfactory way. This Part now considers that question.
A. Obtaining Custody Over Defendants
Perhaps the most substantial obstacle impeding those seeking to prosecute international crimes is their frequent inability to obtain custody over
their indictees. This challenge became apparent at the inception of the first
modern international tribunal—the ICTY—that initially was unable to
convince either the states of former Yugoslavia to surrender its indictees30
or the international community to take meaningful steps to assist the tribunal in its enforcement efforts.31 As time passed, however, the enforcenational Criminal Justice, 61 MOD. L. REV. 1, 6–9 (1998); Stephan Landsman, Alternative
Responses to Serious Human Rights Abuses: Of Prosecution and Truth Commissions, 59 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 83 (1996).
28.
By the Spring of 2014, the ICTY had spent approximately $2.2 billion and the
ICTR approximately $1.6 billion. ICC proceedings have cost more per year than either of the
above two tribunals, with the ICC spending approximately $1.5 billion between 2003 and
2014. The hybrid tribunals have spent less. Costing a mere $56 million during its approximately 5 year lifespan, the Special Panels delivered the least expensive justice. The ECCC
has run up a $157.2 million bill since it opened, and the SCSL spent $212.7 during its 10 years
in existence. Finally, the STL has only just begun its first trial, but it had already cost the
international community nearly $288 million by the Spring of 2014.
29.
The following are the number of defendants prosecuted at each international tribunal as of February 2014: ICTY: 112; ICTR: 75; SCSL: 10; Special Panels: 84; ECCC: 1; and
ICC: 3.
30.
See Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Problems, Obstacles and Achievements of the ICTY,
2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 558, 563 (2004).
31.
See id. at 562 (noting that although successive ICTY Presidents presented numerous reports to the Security Council complaining about lack of cooperation from the states of
the former Yugoslavia, the Security Council “failed to respond in a meaningful way”). States
that were performing peacekeeping functions in the region likewise provided the ICTY little
meaningful enforcement assistance. Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Reflections on the Contributions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 24 HASTINGS INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 155, 160 (2001); see also THEODOR MERON, WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF
AGE 281 (1998); Payam Akhavan, Justice in The Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A
Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 737, 795–96
(1998); Minna Schrag, The Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal: An Interim Assessment, 7 TRANS-
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ment record of international tribunals appeared to improve. The ICTR,
for instance, obtained custody over most of its defendants soon after it
opened, but it did so only because Rwanda’s post-genocide government
desired prosecutions and was willing to apprehend indictees and encourage other states to apprehend indictees.32 The SCSL likewise was able
to try virtually all of its indictees, but again, only because Sierra Leone
approved of prosecutions. As for the ICTY, although its indictments were
utterly ignored for several years after the tribunal’s creation, European
states eventually conditioned European Union (EU) membership for the
states of the former Yugoslavia on those states’ willingness to surrender
indictees to the tribunal,33 and this pressure enabled the tribunal to obtain
custody over all of its indictees.
Although some of these statistics are encouraging, they must be balanced by those that are less positive. For instance, although the ICTR did
obtain custody over virtually all of its indictees very early on, that was only
because it issued indictments exclusively against Hutu perpetrators. The
tribunal’s jurisdiction also encompassed the retaliatory crimes against huNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 22 (1997). Worse still, the NATO-led peacekeeping force
apparently “went out of its way to avoid arresting suspects, reportedly waving Karad_ic and
other suspects through NATO checkpoints.” DIANE F. ORENTLICHER, OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE & INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, THAT SOMEONE
GUILTY BE PUNISHED: THE IMPACT OF THE ICTY IN BOSNIA 28 (2010); see also PIERRE
HAZAN, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF WAR: THE TRUE STORY BEHIND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 92 (James Thomas Snyder trans., 2004).
32.
For instance, in January 1995, the leaders of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania,
Uganda, Zaire, and Zambia agreed to transfer defendants to the ICTR. Stuart Beresford, In
Pursuit of International Justice: The First Four-Year Term of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 8 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 99, 109 (2000). As a consequence of this kind of
cooperation, Ignace Bagilishema was arrested in South Africa. Prosecutor v. Bagilishema,
Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgement, ¶ 8 (June 7, 2001). Clément Kayishema and Jean Paul
Akayesu were arrested in Zambia. Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement, ¶ 14 (May 21, 1999) [hereinafter Kayishema Judgement]; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case
No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, ¶ 9 (Sept. 2, 1998). Also, Obed Ruzindana was arrested in
Kenya. Kayishema Judgement, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, ¶ 15. See also Press Release, ICTR,
Priest, Musician, and Minister Arrested for Genocide, ICTR/INFO-9-2-277.EN (July 12,
2001), available at http://www.unictr.org/tabid/155/Default.aspx?id=338 (reporting on the arrests of three defendants in Switzerland, The Netherlands, and Belgium); Press Release,
ICTR, Captain Sagahutu Pleads Not Guilty, ICTR/INFO-9-2-254.EN (Nov. 25, 2000), available at http://www.unictr.org/tabid/155/Default.aspx?id=365 (reporting the arrest of defendant
Sagahutu in Denmark); Press Release, ICTR, Lieutenant Colonel Muvunyi Transferred to
ICTR Arusha, ICTR/INFO-9-2-247.EN (Oct. 30, 2000), available at http://www.unictr.org/
tabid/155/Default.aspx?id=369 (announcing that Tharcisse Muvunyi was arrested, detained,
and transferred by the United Kingdom). But see Press Release, ICTR, Prosecutor Outlines
Future Plans, ICTR/INFO-9-2-254.EN (Dec. 13, 2000), available at http://ictr-archive09.libra
ry.cornell.edu/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2000/254.html (reporting the Prosecutor’s belief that
the “arrests of some indicted individuals was [sic] being hampered by two African countries
which were harbouring them”).
33.
DIANE F. ORENTLICHER, OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE & INTERNATIONAL
CENTRE FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, SHRINKING THE SPACE FOR DENIAL: THE IMPACT OF
THE ICTY IN SERBIA 33–35 (2008); CARLA DEL PONTE, MADAME PROSECUTOR: CONFRONTATIONS WITH HUMANITY’S WORST CRIMINALS AND THE CULTURE OF IMPUNITY 316–20
(2009).
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manity that the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front perpetrated against the
Hutu, but the ICTR’s efforts to prosecute those crimes ran into insurmountable resistance from Rwanda.34 Thus, although the ICTR might at
first glance appear to constitute an enforcement success because it apprehended most of those whom it indicted, the Tribunal was too weak even to
indict (let alone apprehend) Tutsi offenders. Similarly, although the SCSL
apprehended virtually all of its indictees, that court indicted a mere thirteen individuals, two of whom died before proceedings could commence.35
Finally, although the ICTY’s enforcement record did improve dramatically
as a result of the pressure the EU exerted on the states of the former
Yugoslavia,36 the two men widely considered most culpable for the Bosnian atrocities, Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, were not arrested
until thirteen and sixteen years after their indictments, respectively.37
Moreover, for the ICTY to achieve the results it has, the EU has been
forced to spend a great deal of diplomatic and political capital, which some
believe has undermined its ability to advance other important goals in the
region.38
Turning to other tribunals, the Special Panels were unable to obtain
custody over any of its high-level indictees,39 and pessimism about the
STL’s ability to obtain custody over its indictees was so acute at the tribunal’s very creation that the international community authorized it to con-

34.
See generally Leslie Haskell & Lars Waldorf, The Impunity Gap of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Causes and Consequences, 34 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 49, 75–79 (2011).
35.
Prosecutor v. Foday Saybana Sankoh, Case No. SCSL-2003-02-PT, Withdrawal of
Indictment (Dec. 8, 2003) (Sierra Leone); Prosecutor v. Sam Bockarie, SCSL-2003-04-PT,
Withdrawal of Indictment (Dec. 8, 2003) (Sierra Leone).
36.
Carla Del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, Address at the Policy Briefing for
the European Policy Centre (July 3, 2007), available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Press/Statements%20and%20Speeches/Prosecutor/070603_del-ponte.pdf.
37.
Prosecutor v. Karadžić & Mladić, Case No. IT-95-5-I, Indictment (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia July 24, 1995); Press Release, ICTY, Tribunal Welcomes the Arrest of Ratko Mladić, OTP/1412-e (May 26, 2011), available at http://www.icty.org/sid/10671;
Press Release, ICTY, Tribunal Welcomes the Arrest of Radovan Karadžić, NJ/MOW/1275e
(July 21, 2008), available at http://www.icty.org/sid/9952.
38.
See, e.g., Netherlands Stands Firm in Opposing Deal for Serbia, AGENCE FRANCEPRESSE, Jan. 16, 2008, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20070811181428/http://www.eu
business.com/news-eu/1200499324.24; Serbia Could Have EU Candidacy Status in 2008,
DALJE, Mar. 7, 2007, available at http://dalje.com/en-world/serbia-could-have-eu-candidacystatus-in-2008/24729; Mark John, Belgium Vows to Block EU Shift on Serbia, REUTERS, Feb.
28, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/02/28/us-serbia-belgium-idUSL2746
615720070228.
39.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL & JUDICIAL SYSTEM MONITORING PROGRAMME, INDO& TIMOR-LESTE, JUSTICE FOR TIMOR-LESTE: THE WAY FORWARD, ASA 21/006/2004,
§§ 3.3, 4.1 (2004), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA21/006/2004/en/
c0488a40-d62b-11dd-ab95-a13b602c0642/asa210062004en.pdf; JUDICIAL SYSTEM MONITORING PROGRAMME, THE FUTURE OF THE SERIOUS CRIMES UNIT 10 (2004).
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duct its trials in absentia.40 This pessimism was well founded. The STL has
not obtained custody over any of its indictees, and consequently it was
forced to commence a trial in absentia in January 2014.41 At the ECCC,
three defendants have been convicted, but Cambodia’s opposition to subsequent trials puts their likelihood in grave doubt, despite the strength of
the evidence against those alleged to be their targets.42 Perhaps of greatest
concern for the future of international criminal prosecutions is the enforcement difficulties of the ICC, a permanent body that has considerable
control over the atrocities it prosecutes. Not only has the ICC felt the need
to skew its prosecutorial decisions in response to its enforcement weakness, but it has been largely unsuccessful in obtaining custody over highlevel offenders even after the skewing.
ICC prosecutors maintain that they select their cases and situations
without regard to political considerations,43 but it is unlikely coincidental
that all of the ICC’s current investigations and prosecutions stem from
conflicts in Africa, where states tend to have less global influence and
fewer powerful allies. Admittedly, most of the ICC’s situations were referred by the states in question, or by the Security Council.44 However, the
one situation that the prosecutor initiated via his proprio motu powers also
stems from an African conflict, and the prosecutor strongly encouraged
some of the African self-referrals that the court ultimately received.45
40.
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. Res. 1757, art. 22, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/1757 (May 30, 2007); Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
R. 105 bis, U.N. Doc. STL/BD/2009/01/Rev. 3 (Nov. 10, 2010).
41.
Press Release, Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Ayyash et al. Case Opens at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Jan. 16, 2014), available at http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/media/pressreleases/16-01-2014-ayyash-et-al-case-opens-at-the-special-tribunal-for-lebanon.
42.
Mike Eckel, Groups Fear Khmer Rouge Tribunal May Halt Trial, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, May 4, 2011, available at http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/05/04/groups-fearkhmer-rouge-tribunal-halt-trials/; Colin Meyn, Political Will Lacking as Much as KRT Funding, THE CAMBODIA DAILY, Sept. 3, 2013, available at http://www.cambodiadaily.com/
archives/political-will-lacking-as-much-as-krt-funding-41567/; Robert Carmichael, Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge Tribunal Facing Credibility Crunch, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, May
7, 2011, available at http://www.robertcarmichael.net/Robert_Carmichael/Articles/Entries/
2011/5/7_Cambodias_Khmer_Rouge_tribunal_facing_credibility_crunch.html.
43.
See, e.g., Luis Moreno-Ocampo, The International Criminal Court: Seeking Global
Justice, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 215, 224 (2008).
44.
Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic, Ivory
Coast, and Mali each referred the situations in their countries to the ICC. Ottilia Anna Maunganidze & Antoinette Louw, Implications of Another African Case as Mali Self-refers to the
ICC, INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES (July 24, 2012), available at http://www.issafrica.org/
iss-today/implications-of-another-african-case-as-mali-self-refers-to-the-icc. The Security
Council referred the Darfur and Libyan situations to the ICC. S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005) (Darfur); S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011)
(Libya).
45.
See Paola Gaeta, Is the Practice of ‘Self-Referrals’ a Sound Start for the ICC?, 2 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 949, 949 (2004); Andreas Th. Müller & Ignaz Stegmiller, Self Referrals on
Trial: From Panacea to Patient, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1267, 1268, 1269 n.13 (2010); Svebor
Kranjc, ICC Prosecutor Wants Ivory Coast Atrocities Referred, REUTERS, Apr. 5, 2011, availa-
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Thus, the prosecutor has played a role in selecting most of the situations
currently before the Court.
That all of the ICC’s situations hail from Africa is not intrinsically
problematic. Many of the world’s most brutal conflicts are occurring in
Africa, and the situations presently before the court unquestionably feature sufficiently grave crimes to justify the ICC’s attention. As Martin
Ngogo, prosecutor general of Rwanda, put it: “There is not a single case at
the ICC that does not deserve to be there.” But Ngogo likewise pointed
out that “there are many cases that belong there, that aren’t there,”46 and
it is naı̈ve to think that this fact has nothing to do with the ICC’s enforcement impotence.
Legally speaking, the ICC’s enforcement powers are even weaker
than those of the ICTY,47 and its political capital is likewise less robust.
So, the ICC’s exclusive focus on Africa makes perfect sense. By targeting
crimes committed in globally weak states, the ICC increases the likelihood
of enforcement success both because the international community is more
apt to assist in apprehending perpetrators from those states and because
the states themselves are more easily convinced (or coerced) to self-refer
their situations to the ICC.
Although targeting African crimes increases the odds that the ICC
will obtain custody over its indictees, it creates other problems. Most notably, the ICC’s focus on Africa has persuaded many African states that the
ICC applies a discriminatory double standard,48 at best, or that it promotes “colonialism, slavery and imperialism,”49 at worst. Indeed, the African Union (AU) has become so convinced of the ICC’s partiality that it
not only called for a Security Council deferral of the Darfur50 and Kenyan
situations,51 but it also instructed member states not to assist the ICC in
the arrest of indictee Omar al-Bashir, the President of Sudan.52 Perhaps as
ble at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/05/us-ivorycoast-icc-idUSTRE7346HM201104
05.
46.
Robert Marquand, African Backlash Against International Courts Rises, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 6, 2009, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/
2009/1006/african-backlash-against-international-courts-rises.
47.
See NANCY AMOURY COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
CONSTRUCTING A RESTORATIVE JUSTICE APPROACH 31–35 (2007).
48.
Marquand, supra note 46.
49.
Mary Kimani, Pursuit of Justice or Western Plot? International Indictment Stirs Angry Debate in Africa, AFRICAN RENEWAL, Oct. 2009, at 12 available at http://www
.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/164-icc/48439-pursuit-of-justice-or-western-plot
.html. See also David Kaye, Who’s Afraid of the International Criminal Court, 90 FOREIGN
AFF., May/June 2011, at 118, 125.
50.
Communiqué on the 3 February 2010 Judgment of the International Criminal Court
Appeals Chamber on Darfur, AFRICAN UNION (Feb. 4, 2010), available at http://www.issafrica
.org/uploads/4FevcommEng.pdf.
51.
Argaw Ashine, Kenya Wins AU Support Over ICC Trials, AFRICA REVIEW (Feb.
1, 2011, 9:48 AM), available at http://www.africareview.com/News/-/979180/1099394/-/i65pm
nz/-/index.html.
52.
African Union, Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation of Decision Assembly/AU/DEC.270(XIV) on the Second Ministerial Meeting of
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a consequence, al-Bashir has been able to travel to several ICC states parties in Africa without fear of arrest.53
Finally, and perhaps most worryingly, even though the ICC has
targeted conflicts in states that are more likely to willingly surrender
defendants or bow to pressure to surrender them, as of Spring 2014, the
ICC nonetheless had failed to obtain custody over more than half of its
indictees,54 and most of those who were in ICC custody had offered
no resistance. In particular, of the eight defendants in ICC custody
by the Spring of 2014, three voluntarily surrendered to the court,55 and
two were already in domestic custody when the ICC issued its indictments.56 Similarly concerning is the fact that the Security Council,
which referred the Sudan and Libya situations to the ICC, has shown
little willingness to back up its referrals with enforcement assistance,57
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), ¶ 5, Assembly/AU/
Dec.296(XV) (July 27, 2010).
53.
See Bashir Warrant: Chad Accuses ICC of Anti-Africa Bias, BBC NEWS, July 20,
2010, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-10723869; Court Worry at Omar
Al-Bashir’s Kenya Trip, BBC NEWS, Aug. 28, 2010, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-africa-10723869; ICC reports Djibouti to UN Over al-Bashir Visit, FOX NEWS, May 12,
2011, available at http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/05/12/icc-reports-djibouti-al-bashirvisit/; Sudan’s President Al-Bashir to Visit Egypt Tuesday, SUDAN TRIBUNE, Mar. 7, 2011,
available at http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article38214; Why Arab Leaders Embrace
Sudan’s Indicted President, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 30, 2009, available at http://
www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/0330/p06s04-wome.html; Zambia ‘Won’t Surrender Bashir to ICC’, AFRICA REVIEW, Dec. 12, 2010, available at http://www.africareview
.com/News/-/979180/1071076/-/i7jfdqz/-/index.html. But see ICC Indictment Forcing Bashir to
Stay at Home, VOA NEWS, Oct. 29, 2009, available at http://www.voanews.com/english/news/
a-13-2009-10-29-voa45.html (discussing states that threatened to arrest al-Bashir if he travelled there).
54.
By the Spring of 2014, the ICC had not gained custody over the following defendants: Charles Blé Goudé, Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen,
Ahmad Muhammad Harun, Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, Omar Al-Bashir, Walter
Barasa, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, and Sylvestre Mudacumura. See ICC (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www
.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/Pages/default.aspx (describing each of these defendants as “atlarge”).
55.
See Jeffrey Gettleman, Wanted Congolese Rebel Leader Turns Himself In to US
Embassy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/19/world/
africa/wanted-congolese-rebel-leader-turns-himself-in.html?_r=0; Sudan: Darfur Rebel Leaders Surrender to Hague Court, BBC NEWS, June 16, 2010, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/10329167.
56.
Human Rights Watch, ICC/DRC: New War Crimes Suspect Arrested, REFWORLD,
Feb. 7, 2008, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47b1bf9a20.html.
57.
Maryam Jamshidi, The Enforcement Gap: How the International Criminal Court
Failed in Darfur, AL JAZEERA, Mar. 25, 2013, available at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/
opinion/2013/03/201332562714599159.html. David Kaye notes, for instance, that the Security
Council “could have increased the cost of doing business with Bashir by imposing sanctions
on fugitive Sudanese officials and governments that flout the arrest warrant,” but after making the initial referral, the Security Council now “appears uninterested in giving the court the
kind of support it needs.” Kaye, supra note 49, at 122-23. See also Security Council Must
Urgently Take Action to End Impunity in Darfur- ICC Prosecutor, U.N. NEWS CENTRE, June
5, 2012, available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45090#.Ulv9U47PVZ4;
Bruno Stagno Ugarte, Strengthening the Rule of Law Through the Security Council 3 (Austra-
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despite repeated calls for it to do so.58
Even when international prosecutors can get their hands on indictees,
serious problems of perception arise if the indictees are not the high-level
officials deemed most culpable for the atrocities. The Special Panels, for
instance, prosecuted more than seventy offenders, which is a respectable
number by international tribunal standards; nonetheless, the Panels are
largely considered a failure because they were not able to try any of the
high-level Indonesians who orchestrated the crimes. Indeed, some NGOs
continue to press the international community to establish an ICTY-type
tribunal to bring these high-level Indonesian offenders to justice,59 but it is
widely understood that establishing such a tribunal would be pointless because Indonesia is no more willing to surrender offenders today than it
was ten years ago, and the international community is no more willing to
force Indonesia to do so. The ICC is in a somewhat similar position; although it has apprehended some high-level defendants, most of its most
senior indictees are at-large and are apt to remain so.
Although this Part primarily aims to detail the difficulties that impede
the tribunals in carrying out their day-to-day tasks, I will note that the
tribunals’ enforcement challenges also have the capacity to undermine the
very legitimacy of international criminal law. International offenders are
many, and international resources few; thus, only a tiny proportion of
those who commit international crimes can be prosecuted. This necessary
selectivity is a point I return to in Section C, but here I will also note that,
when that necessary selectivity is deployed in seemingly unprincipled
ways, it becomes especially corrosive.
In particular, when prosecutions feature only low-level offenders or
only atrocities occurring in globally weak states, the credibility of international criminal justice as a whole suffers. Note, as just mentioned, that
commentators do not praise the Special Panels for convicting seventy-odd
offenders who otherwise would have suffered no penalties for their serious
criminal activities. Rather, they label the Special Panels an abject failure
for having convicted only low-level Timorese militia members.60 Likewise,
commentators do not praise the ICC for shining its light on a part of the
lian Civil-Military Centre & the Australian Nat’l Univ. Centre for Int’l Governance and Justice, Working Paper No. 6.2, 2012).
58.
ICC Critical of Security Council’s “Inaction” on Darfur, SUDAN TRIBUNE, June 5,
2013, available at http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article46846; Efforts by Libya, International Partners Vital to Close Impunity Gap, Says ICC Prosecutor, U.N. NEWS CENTRE,
Nov. 14, 2013, available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=46491#.VBpuefld
UmN; Rebecca Lowe, Security Council Must Sanction Libya over al-Senussi Trial, Says Top
Barrister, INT’L B. ASS’N, Oct. 1, 2013, available at http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=e08b9908-ade2-49ba-83f3-e76e3c74558c.
59.
See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Drexler, The Failure of International Justice in East Timor
and Indonesia, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: GLOBAL MECHANISMS AND LOCAL REALITIES AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 49, 51 (Alexander Laban Hinton et al. eds., 2010).
60.
David Cohen, Accountability in the Balance: Trials Before the Special Panels for
Serious Crimes in East Timor 1999–2005, in CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURTS 103, 126 (Magda Karagiannakis ed., 2009).
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world where impunity for brutal atrocities has reigned for centuries. Instead, they criticize the court for targeting Africa when more globally powerful states pass under the court’s gaze.61 These criticisms may be
misguided; it may be that we cannot reasonably expect the international
criminal justice system to be sufficiently powerful and principled so soon
after its inception to enforce its indictments everywhere in the world. But
misguided or not, the inability of international criminal justice systems to
gain custody over their indictees substantially undermines both their dayto-day functioning and their theoretical appeal as transitional justice’s enforcement centerpiece.
B. Finding Accurate Facts
The foregoing Section explored the key pre-trial challenge facing international tribunals: gaining custody over indictees. Even when the tribunals have their defendants in the dock, however, their difficulties do not
end. This Section, therefore, will explore the key trial-related challenge
facing international criminal tribunals: finding accurate facts. Finding facts
accurately is a challenge even in domestic criminal justice systems, where
fact-finders occasionally acquit the guilty,62 convict the innocent,63 and
convict the guilty but for different crimes than those which they committed.64 Unfortunately, accurate facts are even harder to find when the
crimes are international, and this unhappy truth has the potential to further undermine the efficacy of international trials as the centerpiece transitional justice mechanism.
Why are the facts of international crimes so hard to find? For one
thing, charges of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity frequently encompass conduct that spans considerable time and space. Thus,
instead of asking fact-finders to determine whether a defendant robbed
one bank at one location on one date, international fact-finders frequently
must determine facts about a series of events spanning months, if not
years, and hundreds, if not thousands, of miles. These facts can include not
only acts that the defendant himself performed, but also the acts of his
subordinates, his superiors, and his collaborators. Additionally, international fact-finders frequently must find facts concerning the defendant’s
official position in the relevant organization, his de facto role therein, his
61.
See, e.g., MAX DU PLESSIS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT THAT AFRICA
WANTS vi–vii, 13–14 (2010).
62.
See Daniel Givelber, Lost Innocence: Speculation and Data About the Acquitted, 42
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1167, 1167–68 (2005).
63.
For instance, the Innocence Project has identified 317 post-conviction DNA exonerations in the United States. The Innocence Project – DNA Exonerations Nationwide, INNOCENCE PROJECT, available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/DNA__.php (last
visited Aug. 23, 2014). See generally Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful
Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1321 (1997)
(arguing that “America’s criminal justice system creates a significant risk that innocent people will be systematically convicted”).
64.
See Allison Orr Larsen, Bargaining Inside the Black Box, 99 GEO. L.J. 1567,
1569–70 (2011) (discussing intrajury negotiations that result in compromise verdicts).
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relationship to other individuals in that organization, and his mental state
regarding his own actions and the actions of his subordinates and coperpetrators.65
To be sure, international crimes are not the only crimes to require
fact-finding about such complicated sets of relationships and series of
events. Domestic fact-finders in cases involving large-scale drug transactions or organized crime networks must wade through similar complexity.
However, although these crimes may be as wide-ranging and complicated
as international crimes, they typically are prosecuted soon after their occurrence, and they are investigated by means of sophisticated and reliable
techniques, including wiretapping or other electronic surveillance.66 International crimes, by contrast, frequently are not prosecuted until years or
even decades after their occurrence, and international fact-finders are typically assisted by neither electronic nor documentary evidence.67 Unlike
Nazi offenders who documented their every move, modern-day international offenders, particularly those hailing from Africa, leave little, if any,
paper trail,68 and any written records that do exist are often difficult
for prosecutors to obtain.69 Consequently, the vast bulk of the evidence presented to the current international tribunals comes in the form
of witness testimony, virtually all of which is provided by fact witnesses. With the exception of ICTY witnesses, only a tiny percentage
of prosecution witnesses at the international tribunals are experts70
65.
Michelle Fitzpatrick, Khmer Rouge Tribunal Faces Uphill Struggle with Second
Trial, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 18, 2010, available at https://listserv.buffalo.edu/cgibin/wa?A2=ind1009&L=JUSTWATCH-L&H=1&P=135348 (describing the tremendous
complexity of the ECCC’s second trial).
66.
See Daniel Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1264, 1265–67, 1271 (2004).
67.
See Carla Del Ponte, Investigation and Prosecution of Large-Scale Crimes at the
International Level: The Experience of the ICTY, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 539, 552 (2006)
(describing the difficulty of gathering evidence of large-scale crimes without the use of contemporaneous wiretaps or surveillance).
68.

See Kayishema Judgement, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, ¶ 65.

69.
See Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14, Judgement on the Request of the
Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, ¶ 13
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 29, 1997); see also President of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991,
Assessments of the President and of the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1534 (2004), transmitted by Letter to the President of the Security Council, Annex II, ¶¶ 71–73, 75, U.N. Doc. S/
2010/588 (Nov. 19, 2010) (reporting that the prosecution’s long-standing request to Croatia
for military documents regarding Operation Storm remains outstanding).
70.
The ICTY stands as an outlier in this regard because its proceedings do feature
more than a tiny proportion of expert witnesses. See Caroline Davidson, Explaining Inhumanity: When Should Courts Use Experts to Help Define International Crimes?, VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L., (forthcoming 2015). During the SCSL’s first two cases, the prosecution introduced only three expert witnesses out of seventy-five and fifty-nine prosecution witnesses,
respectively. Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgement, Annex
F, ¶ 21 (Aug. 2, 2007); Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-2004-16-T, Judgement, ¶¶
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and their testimony typically does not bear directly on the guilt of the
defendants.71
Studies of domestic proceedings have shown that fact witness testimony is frequently unreliable,72 and my research on international factfinding brings to light the additional difficulties associated with eyewitness
testimony at the international tribunals. As I do not wish to rehearse that
detailed treatment here, I will confine myself to summarizing the conclusions I drew after reviewing thousands of pages of international criminal
transcripts. The most important conclusion is that witnesses at international trials frequently are unwilling or unable to provide the kinds of information that fact-finders need in order to make accurate factual
determinations. For instance, many witnesses have trouble answering
questions that require them to provide dates, distances, duration, and numerical estimations.73 Additionally, many witnesses have trouble answering compound questions and making sense of maps and other twodimensional representations that are often useful in explicating and clarifying their testimony.74 Other witnesses speak in indirect forms, and their
answers appear (at best) to beat around the bush and (at worst) to be
unresponsive or evasive.75 Finally, what clear testimony witnesses do provide is often contradicted by the witnesses’ own pre-trial statements.76 My
study of SCSL and ICTR cases revealed that approximately 50 percent of
10, 149 (June 20, 2007) [hereinafter AFRC Judgement]. Like the SCSL, some early ICTR
cases featured a few expert witnesses. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4T, Decision on a Defence Motion for the Appearance of an Accused as an Expert Witness
(Mar. 9, 1998) (providing one of only a few examples of expert witnesses involved in the
Akayesu case); Kayishema Judgement, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, ¶¶ 29, 73–74, 275, 277, 321,
325 (highlighting how few experts were involved in the Kayishema case), but in many later
cases, no expert witnesses have appeared.
71.
At the ICTR, expert witness testimony was used in the early cases primarily to
establish that a genocide had taken place against the Tutsi. See Akayesu Transcript, supra
note 70, at Feb. 11, 12, 13, 18, 21, 1997; Kayishema Judgement, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, ¶¶
34–54. More recent ICTR and SCSL trials have featured more diverse expert witness testimony. For instance, experts will occasionally testify about the command structure of a particular military force, see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman et al., Case No. SCSL-2004-14T, Transcript, June 14, 2005; Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-2004-16, Transcript,
Oct. 14, 2005, or the powers wielded by a particular defendant, Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case
No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 295–298 (May 15, 2003); Prosecutor v. Ntagerura et al.,
Case No. ICTR-99-46-T, Transcript, Sept. 19, 2001, or those who held the same position as
that of the defendant, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, ¶ 73 (Sept.
2, 1998). However, the testimony of these experts is frequently derived from information
provided to them by the fact witnesses, see, e.g., AFRC Judgement, Case No. SCSL-2004-16T, ¶ 549.
72.
DENTIARY

NANCY AMOURY COMBS, FACTFINDING WITHOUT FACTS: THE UNCERTAIN EVIFOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 14–15 (2010).

73.

Id. at 24–36.

74.

Id. at 36–38, 46–48.

75.

Id. at 49–60.

76.

Id. at 106–29.
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witnesses testified in ways that were seriously inconsistent with their pretrial statements.77
The causes of these difficulties range from the innocent–which can include educational deficiencies, translation errors, and cultural divergences–to the gravely worrying–which can include witness mendacity.
Because it is impossible in most instances to pinpoint a particular reason
for a particular testimonial deficiency, my study concluded that modernday international tribunals operate in a fact-finding fog of inconsistent,
vague, and sometimes incoherent testimony that leaves them unable to say
with any measure of certainty who did what to whom.78 Perhaps a
Rwandan defendant coordinated a massacre at Nyange church, as the
prosecutors allege, but the only evidence that he did comes from alleged
eyewitnesses, and the defense can present a bevy of its own witnesses who
claim that the defendant was with them, far from the massacre site. No
forensic evidence is available to assist judges, and the judges’ ability to
evaluate a witness’s credibility is limited due to the linguistic and cultural
differences that are so prevalent at the international tribunals. My study
revealed that:
[international] witnesses frequently fail to answer questions, but
we cannot know whether it is because they do not know the answers, or because they do not wish to provide them. International
witnesses often testify haltingly and dance around relevant topics,
but we cannot know whether they do so because that is the typical
pattern of speech for their group, because they do not understand
the questions they have been asked, because they have in fact answered directly but a mistranslation has created a seeming divergence between question and answer, or because they purposely
wish to evade the question. And Lord only knows what to make
of the many inconsistencies between witness testimony and pretrial statements that pervade international criminal proceedings.
Witnesses attribute these inconsistencies to investigators’ errors.
Defense counsel attribute them to witness mendacity. And each
explanation, along with a host of others, is plausible.”79
My empirical research led me to conclude that, because the facts of
international crimes are so difficult to find, international tribunals, as a de
facto matter, are forced to engage in a variety of sub-optimal fact-finding
techniques to fill the gaps left by inadequate witness testimony. These include drawing inferences from defendants’ official positions and institutional affiliations and employing a variable standard of proof.80 Although
I do not believe that the international tribunals’ testimonial deficiencies
77.

Id. at 118–22.

78.

Id. at 174.

79.

Id. at 175.

80.
See generally COMBS, supra note 47, at 235–72 (discusses drawing inferences from
defendants’ officials positions), 343–64 (discusses employing a variable standard of proof).
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and the tools used to ameliorate them result in frequent miscarriages of
justice, they do impair the tribunals’ ability to carry out one of its core
functions–accurate fact-finding.
C. Selectivity
This Part has canvassed the challenges the tribunals face in obtaining
custody over indictees and finding facts accurately, but even if these difficulties did not exist, international criminal justice is characterized by a
necessary selectivity that substantially impairs its efficacy. International
crimes are typically perpetrated by large numbers of offenders, and the
prosecution of these offenders costs vast sums of money. Section A revealed that most of those who are indicted will not be apprehended, but
even if we confronted no enforcement difficulties, that is, even if we could
apprehend 100 percent of those we indict, we could prosecute very few
because each prosecution costs so much. As noted in the introduction, the
international community has spent approximately $6 billion to prosecute
285 offenders, creating a per-offender cost of approximately $21 million.81
Certainly, we could increase the number of prosecutions by employing
more efficient procedures and by shifting more prosecutions to less-expensive domestic courts.82 But prosecutions for international crimes are so
extraordinarily expensive—under any circumstances—that such cost-saving measures would not alter the fundamental fact that criminal courts—
whether domestic or international—possess the financial capacity to prosecute only a token number of those who commit international crimes.83
The selectivity that characterizes international criminal justice substantially undermines the ability of international criminal justice to advance the ends typically attributed to it. Space constraints prevent
explicating this point in detail, but suffice it to say here that a criminal
justice system that can prosecute only a miniscule proportion of criminals
81.
This calculation could be seen to underestimate the actual cost of international
prosecutions because it includes the 84 defendants who were prosecuted far more inexpensively than is customary (or optimal) in the now-defunct Special Panels. See David Cohen,
Seeking Justice on the Cheap: Is the East Timor Tribunal Really a Model for the Future?, 61
ASIA PAC. ISSUES 1 (2002). Alternatively, the calculation could be seen to overestimate the
actual cost because it includes the high start-up costs for the ICC, which that court has probably not yet realized.
82.
Also, we could eliminate waste. See Guénaël Mettraux, The Cost of Justice – Is the
ICC Living Beyond Its Means, INT’L CRIM. L. BUREAU (Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.internationallawbureau.com/index.php/the-cost-of-justice-is-the-icc-living-beyond-its-means/.
83.
Rwanda stands as an exception to that rule because it has imposed criminal accountability on a substantial proportion of the hundreds of thousands who perpetrated genocide-related crimes; however, most of its prosecutions were conducted through an alternative
– and frequently criticized – system known as gacaca. See, e.g., Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for
Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006);
Timothy Longman, Trying Times for Rwanda: Reevaluating Gacaca Courts in Post-Genocide
Reconciliation, HARV. INT’L REV. 48, 49, 51–52 (Summer, 2010).
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in its jurisdiction cannot effectively deter, incapacitate, or reconcile.84 Nor
can it effectuate retribution. As Mark Drumbl notes, the tribunals’ “retributive function is hobbled by the fact that only some extreme evil gets punished, whereas much escapes its grasp.”85
D. Summary
The foregoing Sections show that those seeking to prosecute international crimes confront serious challenges. International tribunals frequently are unable to obtain custody over their indictees and even when
they do, they frequently have difficulty finding accurate facts about the
crimes their indictees allegedly committed. Further, the cost of prosecuting international crimes renders prosecutions a post-conflict mechanism
that can be used only infrequently. And infrequent justice is justice that
does not readily advance the goals to which it is aimed. Most discussions of
these and other problems confronting international criminal law conclude
with suggestions for improving the international criminal justice system.
The Security Council is exhorted to assist the international tribunals with
apprehending indictees,86 for instance, or the tribunals are encouraged to
take perjury more seriously.87 This Article takes a different tack. Skeptical
about the likelihood that dramatic improvements can be realized, and cognizant of the opportunity costs inherent in the (expensive) pursuit of international criminal justice, this Article asks whether post-conflict goals
would be better effectuated if we reduced the scope of international criminal justice and re-directed resources and energy to another post-conflict
mechanism, namely financial reparations. There is no point considering
that question, however, until we confirm that we can implement an international reparations system with reasonable effectiveness. That is, if our
efforts to provide reparations are apt to confront the same debilitating
challenges that currently frustrate the international criminal tribunals,
then shifting course makes little sense. Consequently, the next Part considers the international community’s capacity to provide reparations to
victims.
II. REPARATIONS

AS A

VIABLE ALTERNATIVE

The right of crime victims to reparations is well established in both
domestic and international law.88 Various international bodies have con84.
See COMBS, supra note 47, at 47–48. However, some goals can be advanced with
only a few prosecutions. See, e.g., Margaret deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive
Selection at the International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 270 (2012).
85.
DRUMBL, supra note 3, at 151.
86.
See Kaye, supra note 49, at 122–23; DAVID KAYE ET AL., THE COUNCIL AND THE
COURT: IMPROVING SECURITY COUNCIL SUPPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
17–24 (2013), available at http://councilandcourt.org/files/2013/05/The-Council-and-theCourt-FINAL.pdf (recommending ways for the Security Council to better support the ICC).
87.
See COMBS, supra note 72, at 282–83.
88.
For a discussion of state codes mandating a right of reparations for domestic crime
victims, see ILARIA BOTTIGLIERO, REDRESS FOR VICTIMS OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNA-
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firmed and developed these rights,89 and in 2005, the United Nations
(U.N.) General Assembly adopted Basic Principles and Guidelines on the
Right to a Remedy and Reparations for Gross Violations of International
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law, which proclaim a right for victims of international crimes to receive
“adequate, effective, and prompt” remedies.90 These and other laws, along
with political and diplomatic pressures, have occasionally motivated states
and the international community to provide victims with financial reparations. Some states that have engaged in large-scale human rights viola-

LAW 26–28 (2003); Frédéric Mégret, Justifying Compensation by the International
Criminal Court’s Victims Trust Fund: Lessons from Domestic Compensation Schemes, 36
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 123, 130–32 (2010) (providing a discussion of state codes mandating a
right of reparations for domestic crime victims). See also European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes, art. 2, Feb. 1, 1988, E.T.S. 116 (establishing guidelines for victim compensation in the member states of the Council of Europe and for
nationals of those member states). Numerous treaties also provide a right of reparation to
crime victims. See, e.g., Hague Convention Regarding the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare, 1907 Hague Convention IV, art. 3; Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, art. 91, June 8, 1977; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 41, Dec. 10, 1949; American Convention on Human Rights, art.
63(1), Nov. 22, 1969. See generally DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW 114–43 (2d ed. 2005). One can distinguish between the right of reparation found
in humanitarian law treaties and that found in human rights treaties for, whereas the rights
appearing in human rights treaties are owed to individuals, the rights appearing in humanitarian law treaties are arguably owed only to states. See BOTTIGLIERO, supra at 82–89. But see
Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi, Reparation Claims by Individuals for State Breaches of Humanitarian Law and Human Rights: An Overview, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 339, 341–42 (2003) (arguing that article 3 of Hague Convention No. IV and article 91 of Protocol I should be
“interpreted as rules providing for an obligation of reparation in favour both of states and of
injured individuals”). For a discussion of whether a right to a remedy for state abuses can be
considered to reflect customary international law, see SHELTON, supra at 465 (yes); Christian
Tomuschat, Reparations for Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations, 10 TUL. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 157, 183 (2002) (no).
TIONAL

89.
See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, 2004 I.C.J. 131 ¶¶ 152–53 (July 9); Factory at Chorzów (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1928
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 at 47 (Sept. 13); Factory at Chorzów (F.R.G. v. Pol.), Jurisdiction,
1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 21 (July 26) (“It is a principle of international law that the
breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form.”).
See also Richard Falk, Reparations, International Law and Global Justice: A New Frontier, in
THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 2, at 478, 491; Liesbeth Zegveld, Victims Reparations Claims and International Criminal Courts, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 79, 82 (2010) (“This
fundamental principle [of reparations] is established in virtually all domestic legal systems.
This principle is equally applicable in international law.”). Human rights bodies have also
been active in this realm. See, e.g., Velásquez-Rodrı́guez Case, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 4 ¶¶ 133–34 (1988). See also U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Nature of the General
Legal Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. DOC. CCPR/C/21/REV.1/ADD.13, ¶
16 (MAR. 29, 2004); Arturo J. Carrillo, Justice in Context: The Relevance of Inter-American
Human Rights Law and Practice to Repairing the Past, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS,
supra note 2, at 525.
90.
G.A. Res. 60/147, ¶¶ 13–15, U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., Supp. No. 147, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005).
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tions, for instance, have established domestic reparations schemes.91
Other states have elected (or have been forced) to participate in bilateral
or international claims commissions that award compensation to victims of
international crimes.92 Still other states have been brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ),93 regional human-rights courts,94 and
even domestic courts,95 where they have been ordered to pay compensation to individual victims or victim states. And although the ICC is not
authorized to make reparations orders against states, it has become the
first international criminal tribunal authorized to order convicted defendants to pay reparations to victims.96
91.
See, e.g., Marı́a José Guembe, Economic Reparations for Grave Human Rights Violations: The Argentinean Experience, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 2, at
21; Elizabeth Lira, The Reparations Policy for Human Rights Violations in Chile, in THE
HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 2, at 55–56; Erin Daly, Reparations in South Africa: A Cautionary Tale, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 367, 367 (2003).
92.
For a survey of various historical and modern claims commissions, see, respectively, David J. Bederman, The United Nations Claims Commission and the Tradition of International Claims Settlement, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 1 (1994); HOWARD M.
HOLTZMANN & EDDA KRISTJÁNSDÓTTIR, INTERNATIONAL MASS CLAIMS PROCESSES: LEGAL
AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVES 136, 138–39 [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL MASS CLAIMS
PROCESSES]. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission (EECC) is an example of a body that
was voluntarily created by the states in question to adjudicate international humanitarian law
claims, whereas the United Nations Claims Commission (UNCC) was imposed on an unwilling Iraq. Some claims commissions, including some addressing Holocaust claims, have
awarded funds directly to individual victims or victims’ groups. See INTERNATIONAL MASS
CLAIMS PROCESSES, supra at 138–39. Others, such as the UNCC, have paid states that thereafter distributed the appropriate sums to their nationals. See generally Linda A. Taylor, The
United Nations Compensation Commission, in REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE,
WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: SYSTEMS IN PLACE AND SYSTEMS IN THE
MAKING, supra note 2, at 203. Still other claims commissions, such as the EECC, are given no
enforcement authority. Agreement Between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea, Eth.–Eri., Dec. 12, 2000, art. 5
¶ 16, 40 I.L.M. 260.
93.
See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 1, ¶ 1 (Feb. 26) [hereinafter
Genocide Judgment]; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 252 (Dec. 19) [hereinafter DRC v. Uganda].
94.
Among human rights bodies, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has
taken the lead in hearing cases involving large-scale, grave human rights violations and in
awarding compensation therefor. See Carrillo, supra note 89, at 506.
95.
For instance, individual victims can also claim compensation from individual perpetrators through the US Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victims Protection Act,
which permit American courts to issue monetary judgments against foreign nationals found
to have engaged in gross human rights abuses. See, e.g., BETH STEPHENS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN US COURTS 1–88 (2d ed. 2008); BOTTIGLIERO, supra
note 88, at 52–66; SHELTON, supra note 88, at 160–72.
96.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 75; see also Elizabeth Odio-Benito, Foreword to
REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY:
SYSTEMS IN PLACE AND SYSTEMS IN THE MAKING, supra note 6, at 1–2; Reparations for Victims, ICC (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20
court/victims/reparation/Pages/reparation%20for%20victims.aspx.
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Although the foregoing shows that victims of international crime are
legally entitled to reparations, and that some states provide them, most do
not,97 and therefore, most victims of modern international crimes receive
no financial reparations.98 This fact is unsurprising given that most recent
atrocities have occurred during internal armed conflicts in desperately
poor states.99 However, reparations mechanisms are an under-utilized
post-conflict mechanism additionally because the international community
has chosen to prioritize international criminal justice and consequently has
devoted the bulk of its economic, political, and diplomatic capital to prosecutions. “[R]eparations are often an afterthought” to many transitional
justice scholars and policymakers, Lars Waldorf maintains,100 while Liesbeth Zegveld similarly notes that “[r]eparations for victims of serious violations of international criminal law has always been treated as a subject of
secondary importance in international law.”101 Richard Falk agrees, noting that “[r]eparations have received less attention than efforts at criminalizing the perpetrators of gross wrongs.”102
When we provide reparations to victims, we must grapple with a host
of practical and theoretical questions. Among the theoretical are questions
concerning the ontological nature of reparations,103 the way in which reparations derive from both moral and legal principles,104 and the micro and
macro dimensions of reparations.105 Even more importantly, providing
reparations requires us to consider a host of practical questions, including
97.
See BOTTIGLIERO, supra note 88, at 99–103; EVANS, supra note 2, at 8; Falk, supra
note 89, at 495.
98.
See EVANS, supra note 2, at 2; Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Reparations for Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 529, 549 (2003).
99.
Most of the historical claims processes were established following international
armed conflicts that featured a clear victor state that could impose a compensation mechanism on a clear losing state. See, e.g., Bederman, supra note 92, at 1–15.
100.
Lars Waldorf, Goats & Graves: Reparations in Rwanda’s Community Courts, in
REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY:
SYSTEMS IN PLACE AND SYSTEMS IN THE MAKING, supra note 6, at 515.
101.
Zegveld, supra note 89, at 79.
102.
Falk, supra note 89, at 495. See also EVANS, supra note 2, at 9 (“Approaches to
post-conflict analysis have tended to be short-sighted and have failed to pay due consideration to an aspect crucial for the victims: namely, the right to reparation.”).
103.
See RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 119 (2000).
104.
Chris Cunneen, Exploring the Relationship Between Reparations, the Gross Violation of Human Rights and Restorative Justice, in HANDBOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: A
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 355, 356 (Dennis Sullivan & Larry Tifft eds., 2006); George Ulrich,
The Moral Case for Reparations: Three Theses About Reparations for Past Wrongs, 2001
HUM. RTS. DEV. Y.B. 369, 371 (2001).
105.
Brandon Hamber, Narrowing the Micro and Macro: A Psychological Perspective
on Reparations in Societies in Transition, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 2,
at 560, 560–61. For efforts to construct theoretical frameworks for the provision of reparations, see generally Ernesto Verdeja, A Normative Theory of Reparations in Transitional Democracies, in GENOCIDE’S AFTERMATH: RESPONSIBILITY AND REPAIR 166 (Claudia Card &
Armen T. Marsoobian eds., 2007); David C. Gray, A No-Excuse Approach to Transitional
Justice: Reparations as Tools of Extraordinary Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1043 (2010);
Mégret, supra note 88, at 127 (exploring rationales for the work of the ICC’s Trust Fund for
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who should receive reparations,106 who should pay reparations,107 and
what form should the reparations take.108
Although these issues are of tremendous significance, most of them do
not concern us at this juncture because they arise after the decision to
provide reparations has already been made. This Part instead considers
that foundational question—whether to provide reparations—and asks, as
a preliminary matter, whether we could implement an international reparations scheme with reasonable effectiveness. Effectiveness, like everything else in life, must be assessed relatively, so this Part compares the
international community’s capacity to provide reparations with its capacity
to conduct prosecutions. Consequently, this Part tracks Part I by first asking whether the international community is better able to obtain money
for reparations than to obtain custody over individual offenders. Secondly,
this Part asks whether the international community is better able to engage in accurate fact-finding with regard to reparations awards than with
regard to criminal convictions. The tentative conclusions outlined in this
Part pave the way for a discussion of their implications in Part III.
A. Obtaining Funds for Reparations
Before beginning our comparative analysis, various questions must be
considered and assumptions made. First among the assumptions is that the
international reparations body that we are postulating can order reparations without a predicate criminal conviction. This is crucial, for if a predicate criminal conviction were required, then the international community
would confront the same challenges described in Part I. Because most reparations schemes discussed above have provided reparations without makVictims “in an attempt to build one of the first theoretical frameworks of its work”); Jeremy
Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, 103 ETHICS 4 (1992).
106.
Theo van Boven, Victims’ Rights to a Remedy and Reparation: The New United
Nations Principles and Guidelines, in REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR
CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: SYSTEMS IN PLACE AND SYSTEMS IN THE MAKING, supra note 6, at 19, 34–36; Edda Kristjánsdóttir, International Mass Claims Processes and
the ICC Trust Fund for Victims, in REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES
AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: SYSTEMS IN PLACE AND SYSTEMS IN THE MAKING, supra
note 6, at 167, 179–83; Ellen L. Lutz, After the Elections: Compensating Victims of Human
Rights Abuses, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH
FORMER REGIMES, GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 3, at 551, 557–59; Wendy Orr,
Reparation Delayed is Healing Retarded, in LOOKING BACK REACHING FORWARD: REFLECTIONS ON THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA 239, 244
(Charles Villa-Vicencio & Wilhelm Verwoerd eds., 2000); Carla Sandoval-Villalba, The Concepts of ‘Injured Party’ and ‘Victim’ of Gross Human Rights Violations in the Jurisprudence of
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: A Commentary on Their Implications for Reparations, in REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY: SYSTEMS IN PLACE AND SYSTEMS IN THE MAKING, supra note 6, at 243, 247–78.
107.
TEITEL, supra note 103, at 138–39; Lutz, supra note 104, at 559–61; Alexander
Segovia, Financing Reparations Programs: Reflections From International Experience, in THE
HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 2, at 650, 655.
108.
Danieli, supra note 6, at 59–63; de Greiff, supra note 2, at 467–71; Hamber, supra
note 105, at 570–80; Orr, supra note 106, at 244.
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ing any criminal law determinations,109 that is a reasonable assumption to
make. First among the questions is from what source would reparations
funding be sought? Funding could be obtained from non-culpable or culpable sources; if it is obtained from non-culpable sources, it could be obtained through voluntary contributions or assessments, and if it is obtained
from culpable sources, it could be obtained from culpable individuals, culpable states, or both. Each of these funding sources necessitates a different
analysis, so each will be addressed in turn.
I will begin by considering an international reparations body funded
by non-culpable sources through voluntary donations. Such bodies already
exist. The United Nations administers trust funds to benefit victims of torture and slavery,110 and the states parties to the ICC also created a Trust
Fund for Victims (TFV) to provide reparations for crimes within the
court’s jurisdiction.111 A cursory look at these bodies reveals a key problem with voluntary donations: they are an unstable—and frequently inadequate—source of funding. For instance, between July 2011 and July 2012,
the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for the Victims of Torture received $8.1 million, but donations had decreased by thirty percent during
the previous three years,112 and a whopping seventy percent of the total
donations came from one nation, the United States.113 Other trust funds
have generated fewer resources, and their budgets were equally unstable.
For instance, in the last few years, the United Nations Voluntary Trust
Fund on Contemporary Forms of Slavery has been receiving annual donations of approximately $500,000, but annual donations were nearly double
that in 2008 and less than half that in 2007.114 The ICC’s TFV, for its part,

109.
But see Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 75(2) (authorizing the ICC to “make an
order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate reparations”).
110.
See, e.g., United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture, G.A. Res. 36/151,
U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/151 (Dec. 16, 1981); United Nations Voluntary
Trust Fund on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, G.A. Res. 46/122, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/122 (Dec. 17, 1991).
111.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 79(1). Up until now, these trust funds have not
provided reparations to individual victims but rather have funded projects designed to assist
victims and communities in which crimes have taken place. Catherine E. Sweetser, Note,
Providing Effective Remedies to Victims of Abuse by Peacekeeping Personnel, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1643, 1668–69 (2008); see also, e.g., TRUST FUND FOR VICTIMS, LEARNING FROM THE
TFV’S SECOND MANDATE: FROM IMPLEMENTING REHABILITATION ASSISTANCE TO REPARATIONS, FALL 2010 PROGRAMME PROGRESS REPORT 5–7 (2010), available at http://www.trust
fundforvictims.org/sites/default/files/imce/TFV%20Programme%20Report%20Fall%202010
.pdf [hereinafter TRUST FUND FOR VICTIMS].
112.
U.N.G.A., United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture: Rep. of the Secretary General, ¶¶ 9, 12 A/67/264 (Aug. 7, 2012).
113.

Id. ¶ 12.

114.
U.N. Secretary-General, United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund on Contemporary
Forms of Slavery: Rep. of the Secretary General, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. A/67/269 (Aug. 8, 2012); see
also U.N. Secretary-General, United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund on Contemporary Forms
of Slavery: Rep. of the Secretary General, 5, U.N. Doc. A/67/306 (Aug. 18, 2009).
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raised about =
C 7.3 million (approximately $9.1 million) between 2004 and
April 2011.115
Assessed funding eliminates the instability inherent in voluntary funding, and it also finds precedent in international and domestic law. The
ICTY and ICTR, for instance, are funded through the United Nations’
regular budget,116 and states typically fund their domestic compensation
schemes through their general budgets.117 Stable funding does not mean
adequate funding, however, and the international community almost certainly would be unwilling to devote considerable resources to an international reparatory body if it were at the same time spending hundreds of
millions dollars on prosecutions for international crimes. Thus, voluntary
or assessed funding can become an adequate source for reparations only if
some funds currently devoted to prosecutions are diverted to reparations.118 Space constraints prevent me from carefully analyzing just how
much money would be required to provide a minimally acceptable quantity of reparations to a minimally acceptable proportion of victims, but
given the vast sums currently spent on prosecutions, it seems plausible to
conclude that, if the international community made compensating victims
a considerably higher post-conflict priority, and diverted sums accordingly,
it could do a creditable job of providing reparations to victims.
Although this is an encouraging conclusion, funding from non-culpable parties gives rise to one key disadvantage: it severs the link between
the violation and the reparations. Reparations that are derived from culpable states or individuals, by contrast, not only provide victims with tangible assistance but also impose much-needed accountability on offenders.
Such accountability is desirable under any circumstances and would prove
all the more valuable in a world featuring fewer criminal trials because it
would advance to some degree the retributive and deterrence goals that
115.
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, REGISTRY
FACT SHEET 5 (2011).

AND

TRUST FUND

FOR

VICTIMS

116.
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR
SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA SINCE 1991, UPDATED STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, art. 32 (Sept. 2009), originally
established by S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY STATUTE]; S.C. Res. 955, Annex, art. 30, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR
STATUTE].
117.
For a discussion of these schemes, see, for example, MARTIN WRIGHT, JUSTICE
VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS: A RESTORATIVE RESPONSE TO CRIME 43–45 (1996).

FOR

118.
Some victims and commentators have suggested such a diversion. See, e.g., Aloys
Habimana, Judicial Responses to Mass Violence: Is the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda Making a Difference Towards Reconciliation in Rwanda, in INTERNATIONAL WAR
CRIMES: MAKING A DIFFERENCE? 83, 86 (Steven R. Ratner & James L. Bischoff eds., 2004);
Rachel Kerr & Jessica Lincoln, War Crimes Research Group, Department of War Studies,
Kings College London, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Outreach, Legacy and Impact
Final Report, at 23 (Feb. 2008); Vincent O. Nmehielle & Charles Chernor Jalloh, International Criminal Justice: The Legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 30 FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF., Summer 2006, at 107, 109–10.
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trials also seek to further.119 Consequently, this Part now considers reparations funding from culpable sources. In particular, it explores whether an
international reparatory body would be better able to enforce its awards
than a criminal body its indictments? The Section concludes that a reparations body would have greater success because states and individuals are
more likely to voluntarily pay a reparations award than to surrender to an
indictment.
Turning first to culpable states, numerous precedents suggest that
states would be more inclined to voluntarily comply with orders requiring
reparations than with orders requiring the surrender of indictees. For one
thing, the fact that many states voluntarily undertake reparations obligations at the same time that they steadfastly prevent the imposition of criminal penalties shows that states often find compensating victims more
politically palatable than punishing offenders. Several South American
countries provide clear examples of this phenomenon, as they shielded
from criminal prosecution virtually all of the individuals responsible for
the widespread torture and forced disappearances that characterized their
Dirty Wars.120 At the same time, however, these countries established
119.
For the view that reparations serve to deter atrocities, see HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, COMMENTARY TO THE SECOND PREPARATORY COMMISSION ON RULES OF PROCEDURE AND ELEMENTS OF CRIMES 36 (1999); Gillard, supra note 98, at 530
120.
Argentina initially prosecuted some high-level members of the former government. See generally Paula K. Speck, The Trial of the Argentine Junta, 18 INTER-AM. L. REV.
491 (1987). However, these leaders and others awaiting prosecution were soon pardoned
following strong military protests. See CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL
103–104 (1996). Prosecutions of lower-level defendants were also initiated but, when military
unrest grew as a result, the new democratic government of Raúl Alfonsı́n tried to limit the
remaining prosecutions. NINO, supra at 90–95; José Zalaquett, Confronting Human Rights
Violations Committed by Former Governments: Principles Applicable and Political Constraints, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES, GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 3, at 3, 25. These measures failed to
stem the unrest, however, and the government eventually felt compelled to pass a “due obedience” law that effectively provided amnesty to virtually all defendants. NINO, supra at
94–95, 100–01; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave
Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 449, 459 (1990). Soon after
taking office in 2003, President Néstor Kirchner championed the abolition of amnesty laws
and pardons. Larry Rohter, Now the Dirtiest of Wars Won’t be Forgotten, N.Y. TIMES, June
18, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/18/international/americas/18LETT
.html. Later that year, the Senate voted to repeal the amnesty, and the Supreme Court struck
down the pardons as unconstitutional. Mayra Pertossi, Argentine Court Revokes Dirty War
Amnesty, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 14, 2005, available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/fnews/1423004/posts. Prosecutions began again in 2006 and have targeted high-level former
government officials. Larry Rohter, After 30 Years, Argentina’s Dictatorship Stands Trial,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2006, at A3; Argentina Starts “Dirty War” Trial of an Ex-Officer, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2007, at A14; Trial Begins for a Former President of Argentina, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 2009, at A5; Charles Newbery & Alexei Barrionuevo, 25 Years for Leader of Argentine Dictatorship, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2010, at A8.
Similarly, Chile, while still under the rule of Augusto Pinochet, passed blanket amnesties that
shielded the military from prosecutions. See, e.g., ALEXANDRA BARAHONA DE BRITO,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA: URUGUAY AND CHILE 105
(1997); William W. Burke-White, Reframing Impunity: Applying Liberal International Law
Theory to an Analysis of Amnesty Legislation, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 467, 482–83 (2001). In the
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government reparations schemes to compensate victims, and some even
permitted victims to initiate civil actions seeking compensation from offenders.121 Similarly, South Africa never seriously contemplated prosecuting apartheid-era officials because it was understood that doing so would
unleash violent resistance to the democratic transition.122 By contrast,
plans to pay financial reparations to victims not only elicited no controversy, but the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act
expressly contemplated reparations.123 Admittedly, South Africa faced
political and economic obstacles that delayed the payment of reparations
and necessitated smaller reparations awards than had initially been hoped
for,124 but these obstacles paled in comparison to the difficulty South Africa would have confronted had it attempted to prosecute offenders.125 As
Malamud-Goti and Grosman observe:
early 2000s, however, Chilean courts began to allow prosecutions of former military officials
despite the amnesties. See Sebastian Brett, Justice a Step Closer in Chile, THE OBSERVER,
May 30, 2004, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/may/30/pinochet.chile;
Louise Egan, Victims: Chile’s Human Rights Plan Soft on Military, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2003.
Brazil, for its part, has resisted prosecutions to this day. Alexei Barrionuevo, Amnesty for
Brazil Dictatorship is Challenged, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2010/12/16/world/americas/16brazil.html. See NINO, supra, at 33–34 (providing an early
discussion of Brazil’s amnesty law).
121.
See Lira, supra note 91, at 86–90 (discussing Chile); CYNTHIA G. BROWN, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE “POLITICS OF AGREEMENTS”: CHILE DURING PRESIDENT AYLWIN’S FIRST
YEAR 9 (1991) (featuring a review of Chile’s amnesty law of April 18, 1978, in part III of the
book); see also Burke-White, supra note 120, at 497 (Argentina’s amnesty law “does not
preclude civil means of rederess.”). See Guembe, supra note 91, at 21 (discussing Argentina);
HORACIO VERBITSKY, THE FLIGHT: CONFESSIONS OF AN ARGENTINE DIRTY WARRIOR 166
(1996) (describing the reparations plan in the afterward by Juan E. Méndez). See Ignacio
Cano & Patricia Salvão Ferreira, The Reparations Program in Brazil, in THE HANDBOOK OF
REPARATIONS, supra note 2, at 102 (discussing Brazil).
122.
KENNETH CHRISTIE, THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRUTH COMMISSION 135 (2000)
(describing his interview with Commissioner Mgojo, who opined that “if amnesty had not
been given during the negotiations, . . . South Africa would have seen a blood bath”).
123.
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 1995, at Ch. 2, ¶¶
3(1)(c) and 3(2)(c) (S. Afr.).
124.
Brandon Hamber, Rights and Reasons: Challenges for Truth Recovery in South
Africa and Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1074, 1079 (2003); Ginger Thompson,
South Africa to Pay $3,900 to Each Family of Apartheid Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2003.
Some also complained about the government’s failure to consult with relevant stakeholders
before deciding on the amount for reparations. See Oupa Makhalemele, Still Not Talking:
The South African Government’s Exclusive Reparations Policy and the Impact of R30,000
Financial Reparations on Survivors, in REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR
CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: SYSTEMS IN PLACE AND SYSTEMS IN THE MAKING, supra note 6, at 541, 542. For a detailed discussion of the effort to provide reparations in
South Africa, see Daly, supra note 91.
125.
Indeed, South Africa offered official amnesty only to those offenders who applied
before the country’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Although South Africa did conduct a few high-profile trials, COMBS, supra note 47, at 42, it abandoned these efforts largely
because it lacked the financial resources to continue them, id., and may also have lacked the
political will, DAVID DYZENHAUS, JUDGING THE JUDGES, JUDGING OURSELVES: TRUTH,
RECONCILIATION AND THE APARTHEID LEGAL ORDER 119–20 (1998).
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[many new democracies] lack the power to conduct criminal trials
against the perpetrators. Civil proceedings, however, are a different story. They usually do not give rise to the kind of uneasiness
among the group of perpetrators that the threat of criminal trials
involves, and therefore the transitional government may be able
to cope with them.126
Admittedly, not every state favors reparations over prosecutions. A
few, such as Uganda and Rwanda, have not provided reparations while
they have promoted prosecutions either at the domestic or international
level. Such states are rare, however, and typically use prosecutions as a
means of repressing dissent, maintaining control,127 or gaining the upper
hand in an on-going conflict.128 Because reparations to victims provide
these governments no similar benefits, they are not undertaken.129 Other
states, such as Peru, both prosecute offenders130 and compensate victims,131 but these typically undertake only a very small number of prosecutions.132 For instance, although Peru admirably did prosecute its former
President, Alberto Fujimori,133 the remainder of its planned prosecutions
126.
Malamud-Goti & Grosman, supra note 4, at 553.
127.
See, e.g., Longman, supra note 83, at 49, 51–52; Brian Walsh, Resolving the Human
Rights Violations of a Previous Regime, 158 WORLD AFF. 111, 113 (1996).
128.
Uganda’s request for ICC investigations, for instance, was widely viewed as an
effort to target rebel forces while reducing the likelihood that the ICC would investigate
Uganda’s own crimes. DRUMBL, supra note 3, at 144; see also William Burke-White & Scott
Kaplan, Shaping the Contours of Domestic Justice: The International Criminal Court and an
Admissibility Challenge in the Uganda Situation, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 79, 80 (Carsten Stahn & Göran Sluiter eds., 2009) (“For
Museveni, referral of the situation in Uganda to the ICC was essentially a political calculation that offered several advantages.”). Further, when ICC indictments began to impede
Uganda’s ability to negotiate with LRA rebels, Uganda sought withdrawal of the indictments. See Burke-White & Kaplan, supra at 82–83; Michael Sung, Uganda Wants ICC Review
of LRA Rebel Indictments, PAPER CHASE, June 21, 2007, available at http://jurist.org/
paperchase/2007/06/uganda-wants-icc-review-of-lra-rebel.php.
129.
See Waldorf, supra note 100, at 519–23 (discussing the issues that regimes, especially new regimes, have with reparations). Also, whereas Cote d’Ivoire President Outtara
asked the ICC to launch investigations into the violence that followed that country’s disputed
November 2010 election, he has not made efforts to pay reparations. See ICC Press Release,
Situation in Côte d’Ivoire assigned to Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-CPI-20110520-PR672, May
20, 2011; Victims in Cote d’Ivoire Meet on Right to Reparation, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (Aug. 8, 2013), available at http://ictj.org/news/victims-cote-d’ivoiremeet-right-reparation.
130.
Jo-Marie Burt, Guilty as Charged: The Trial of Former Peruvian President Alberto
Fujimori for Human Rights Violations, 3 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 384, 390–95, 397–99
(2009).
131.
Milagros Salazar, At Last, Reparations for Civil War Victims, GLOBAL POLITICS
AND POLITICAL ECONOMY, Feb. 9, 2011, http://globalgeopolitics.net/wordpress/2011/02/09/
rights-peru-at-last-reparations-for-civil-war-victims.
132.
Walsh, supra note 127, at 113 (“Even in countries where prosecutions have occurred, only a minuscule sampling of the guilty have been prosecuted.”).
133.
See generally, Burt, supra note 130 (analyzing the Fujimori trial and highlighting its
implications for Peruvian politics).
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stalled due to political obstructions.134 In sum, although there is no postatrocity blueprint followed by every state, it can be fairly said that states
establishing transitional justice mechanisms usually find it easier to compensate victims than to prosecute offenders.
This conclusion is reinforced by statistics concerning state compliance
with the judgments of human rights courts. The Inter-American Court of
Human Rights (IACtHR), for instance, routinely orders various forms of
reparations for large-scale human rights abuses;135 in particular, not only
does it order states to provide victims with monetary compensation,136 it
frequently orders the provision of other tangible reparations, such as medical and psychological treatment,137 and educational benefits.138 The
IACtHR also orders intangible reparations, such as public apologies, days
of remembrance,139 and the naming of streets and public institutions after
victims.140 Finally, and most relevantly, the IACtHR also orders states to
prosecute alleged offenders, but it is these latter orders that meet the
134.

Laplante and Theidon observed:

Although Peru did not offer political amnesty as was done in South Africa, it nevertheless faces the reality of a judicial system that cannot be reformed overnight,
preventing timely and workable trials. Upon terminating its work, the TRC transferred forty-three of the most emblematic and substantiated criminal cases to the
Minister of the Interior for further investigation. Yet more than two years later,
twenty-four had still not been open for investigation and only one had resulted in a
final sentence: acquittal. In actuality, even in the absence of amnesty, political influence delays and even obstructs criminal investigations and trials. A recent report from the Peruvian Ombudsman’s office reveals a myriad of suspicious
obstacles presented by the military such as refusing to share evidence, thus undermining the handful of criminal investigations opened pursuant to the TRC’s
recommendations.
Laplante & Theidon, supra note 20, at 243–44.
135.
Carrillo, supra note 89, at 506 (reporting that the Court was “[a]t the forefront of
[a] legal revolution” by issuing the first judgment “to articulate the duty to prevent, investigate and punish human rights violations alongside the state’s separate duty to make moral
and material reparations to individual victims”); Thomas M. Antkowiak, Remedial Approaches to Human Rights Violations: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Beyond, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 351, 355–64 (2007–2008). The European Court of Human
Rights, in particular, has lagged behind the Inter-American court when it comes to remedies.
See Christian Tomuschat, Reparations for Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations, 10 TUL.
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 157, 161–65 (2002).
136.
See, e.g., Velásquez-Rodrı́guez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶¶ 33–34;
Godı́nez-Cruz v. Honduras, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 8 (July 21, 1989).
137.
See, e.g., Case of Children’s Rehabilitation v. Paraguay, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 112, ¶¶ 318–20 (Sept. 2, 2004); Case of Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 105, ¶¶ 107–08 (Apr. 29, 2004); Case of
Cantoral-Benavides v. Peru, Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 88, ¶
51.e (Dec. 3, 2001); Case of Serrano Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 120, ¶¶ 197–200 (Mar. 1, 2005).
138.
“Cantoral-Benavides,” Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 88, ¶ 80.
139.
“Serrano Cruz Sisters,” Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 120, ¶ 196.
140.
Case of Myrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 101, ¶ 286 (Nov. 25, 2003).
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greatest state resistance. Indeed, compensation has been paid in compliance with a great many IACtHR decisions; Peru and Guatemala alone
have paid millions of dollars in compensation pursuant to IACtHR decisions.141 Likewise, states often comply with orders requiring other measures; thus, they frequently release prisoners found to be illegally
detained,142 they amend or invalidate laws deemed to violate the American Convention on Human Rights,143 they adopt legislation necessary to
implement the Convention’s substantive provisions,144 and they make
public apologies.145 In virtually every case, however, the Court also orders the state to investigate, prosecute, and punish the individuals responsible for the human rights violation, yet these orders are rarely fulfilled.146
Indeed, scholars report that whereas states are most likely to comply with
orders to pay compensation,147 they are least likely to comply with orders
to investigate and prosecute offenders.148
Although the foregoing precedents strongly suggest that states are
more willing to relinquish money than offenders, another recent precedent
could appear to point in the opposite direction. Unlike previous international criminal tribunals, the ICC can order convicted persons to pay financial reparations to victims.149 During the negotiations regarding this
141.
See REDRESS, ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDS FOR VICTIMS OF TORTURE AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 38 (May 2006) [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDS], available
at http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/master_enforcement%2030%20May%20
2006.pdf.
142.
See, e.g., Loayza Tamayo v. Peru (Merits), Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 33, ¶ 84, op. ¶ 5 (Sept. 17, 1997).
143.
See, e.g., Suarez Rosero v. Ecuador, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 44,
¶ 80 (Jan. 20, 1999).
144.

“Street Children,” Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No. 77, ¶ 29.

145.

See ENFORCEMENT

OF

AWARDS, supra note 141, at 39.

146.
Id.; see also Fernando Basch et al., The Effectiveness of the Inter-American System
of Human Rights Protection: A Quantitative Approach to its Functioning and Compliance
with its Decisions, 7 SUR INT’L J. H.R. 9, 19, 22 (2010).
147.

Basch et al., supra note 146, at 20–21.

148.
Id. at 19–24; James L. Cavallaro & Stephanie Erin Brewer, Reevaluating Regional
Human Rights Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the Inter-American Court,
102 AM. J. INT’L L. 768, 781 (2008) (“While states generally pay monetary damages, there are
very few cases of full compliance, which is notably lacking as regards the obligation to bring
perpetrators of violations to justice.”); Eric Posner & John Yoo, Judicial Independence in
International Tribunals, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 43 (2005) (“From our survey of the IACHR’s
cases, it appears that while states routinely ignore the requirement that they punish offenders
or change their laws, they have often paid financial compensation.”); see also Darren Hawkins & Wade Jacoby, Partial Compliance: A Comparison of the European and Inter-American
Courts of Human Rights, 6 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 35, 57–58 (2010); Alexandra Huneeus,
International Criminal Law by Other Means: The Quasi-Criminal Jurisdiction of the Human
Rights Courts, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 24–25 (2013) (noting that like the Latin American states,
Russia “has paid just compensation . . . but has failed to investigate”).
149.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 75. Rule 105(A) of the ICTY’s and ICTR’s
Rules of Procedure and Evidence authorize a Trial Chamber to “hold a special hearing to
determine the matter of the restitution of the property or the proceeds thereof,” but to my
knowledge no such hearing has ever been convened. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
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provision, some delegations proposed allowing ICC Trial Chambers also to
order or request states to provide reparations to victims, but this proposal
was defeated.150 According to a delegate from the United Kingdom,
Christopher Muttukumaru, the most cogent argument raised against the
inclusion of state responsibility for reparations was that “the Court was
intended to be a court dealing with individual criminal responsibility. If
awards of reparations could be made against states, the principle of individual responsibility would have become meaningless,” and many of the
jurisdictional and admissibility provisions of the Rome Statute would have
required revision.151
Muttukumaru’s explanation suggests that the delegations that opposed state responsibility for reparations did so primarily because they did
not consider a body charged with determining the criminal liability of individuals to be an appropriate forum for determining the civil, reparatory
obligations of states. Certainly, some states might have opposed the proposal—alternatively or additionally—because they did not wish to subject
themselves to potential reparations orders, but I could find no written negotiating history in which that view was expressed. Consequently, the
precedents involving domestic reparations schemes and compliance with
the orders of human rights courts indicate that we can expect an international reparations body to benefit from a great deal more voluntary compliance than the international criminal tribunals receive.
The foregoing analysis centered on states and their likely compliance
with reparations orders, but the same conclusions should apply to individuals. Admittedly, we have less information to support our analysis.
Whereas states frequently are ordered both to prosecute offenders and
compensate victims, individuals are not typically placed under such dual
obligations, and more importantly, individuals, unlike states, are less frequently imbued with the de facto power to decide whether or not to comply with judicial orders. But studies show—unsurprisingly—that
I.C.J. Acts & Docs., 107, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev/ 49 (May 22, 2013), available at http://www.icty
.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT032Rev49_en.pdf (adopted by
Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda). The Presidents of both tribunals asked the Security Council to
establish victims’ trust funds similar to that of the ICC, but the Security Council did not do
so. Letter from President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to
the Security Council (May 12, 2011), U.N. Doc. S/2011/316, http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/
Reports%%20Publications/CompletionStrategy/completion___.pdf; Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (Dec. 15, 2000), 5, U.N. Doc. S/2000/
1198, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/801/55/PDF/N0080155
.pdf?OpenElement.
150.
See David Donat-Cattin, Article 75: Reparations to Victims, in COMMENTARY ON
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 1399, 1406 n.34 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008); Christopher Muttukumaru, Reparation to Victims, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING
OF THE ROME STATUTE 262, 267–69 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999).
151.
Muttukumaru, supra note 150, at 268. See also Fiona McKay, Are Reparations Appropriately Addressed in the ICC Statute?, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, PEACE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 163, 168–70 (Dinah Shelton
ed., 2000).
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individuals consider a fine to be less a severe penalty than imprisonment,152 so we can assume that, were such a choice to exist, individuals
would be more likely to voluntarily relinquish their money than their
freedom.
The fact that an international reparations body would benefit from
more voluntary compliance than an international criminal tribunal is significant, but it would also be useful to consider whether a reparations body
would have greater success in enforcing its compensation awards against
non-compliant states and individuals than the international criminal tribunals have had in enforcing their indictments. On the one hand, it is hard to
tell because the international community has only rarely used its muscle
either to obtain reparations for victims or to enforce civil judgments. Indeed, the U.N. Charter expressly contemplates a role for the Security
Council in enforcing ICJ judgments when a party to a judgment does not
voluntarily comply,153 but the Security Council has almost never been
asked to assist in enforcing ICJ decisions.154
Commentators have nonetheless described a range of powerful enforcement measures that are available to the Security Council should it
desire to enforce an ICJ judgment. They note, for instance, that the Security Council could enlist the assistance of U.N. specialized agencies, such as
the World Bank or the International Civil Aviation Organization, to use
the means at their disposal to pressure the delinquent state;155 it could call
on member states to apply sanctions against the state,156 or it could order
member states to attach or seize assets in their territory belonging to the
state for purposes of satisfying the state’s obligations under the judgment.157 Presumably, the Security Council would be able to implement
these same measures to enforce the awards of a reparations body, so long
as it found non-enforcement to threaten international peace and security.
Marc Henzelin, for instance, describes the robust role the Security Council

152.
See Leslie Sebba & Gad Nathan, Further Explorations in the Scaling of Penalties,
23 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY, 221, 231 (1984).
153.

U.N. Charter, art. 94(2).

154.
Conor McCarthy, Reparation for Gross Violations of Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law at the International Court of Justice, in REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: SYSTEMS IN PLACE
AND SYSTEMS IN THE MAKING, supra note 6, at 283, 304 n.76. Most states that initially filed
complaints with the Security Council subsequently abandoned them. CONSTANZE SCHULTE,
COMPLIANCE WITH DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 39 (2004). In the
few remaining instances, the Security Council failed to provide any assistance. Id.; McCarthy,
supra at 304 n.76.
155.
Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Prospects for Enforcing Monetary Judgments of the
International Court of Justice: A Study of Nicaragua’s Judgment against the United States, 30
VA. J. INT’L L. 891, 910–11 (1990).
156.

Id. at 909.

157.
Oscar Schachter, The Enforcement of International Judicial and Arbitral Decisions,
54 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 22 (1960).

Winter 2015]

From Prosecutorial to Reparatory Justice

253

could play in enforcing the ICC’s reparations orders, including by confiscating state assets to ensure the availability of reparations.158
Most compellingly, the Security Council’s creation of the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) in the aftermath of the 1991
Gulf War provides particularly probative evidence of the international
community’s substantial capacity to compensate victims. The crimes in
question took place during Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. After allied
forces expelled Iraq from Kuwait, the Security Council found Iraq liable
for all direct loss, damage, or injury that resulted from its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.159 The Security Council then established
the UNCC to administer compensation claims for these losses.160 Although certain aspects of the UNCC generated controversy,161 it unquestionably proved a highly effective means of compensating victims. The
UNCC received more than 2.7 million claims, the vast majority of which
were submitted by individuals who had been forced to leave Kuwait or
who had suffered serious mental or bodily injury due to Iraq’s invasion
and occupation,162 and it awarded $11.7 billion in compensation to individual claimants, all of which was paid from the UNCC’s compensation
fund.163 Resources to pay the compensation awards were derived from
Iraq’s oil revenues.164
158.
Marc Henzelin et al., Reparations to Victims Before the International Criminal
Court: Lessons Learned from International Mass Claims Processes, 17 CRIM. L. FORUM. 317,
330 (2006).
159.

S.C. Res. 687, ¶ 16, U.N. SCOR, 46th year, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 8, 1991).

160.

Id. ¶ 18.

161.
For example, some questioned the Security Council’s authority to impose automatic liability on Iraq based only on its illegal invasion and occupation of Kuwait. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Claims Settlement and the United Nations Legal Structure, in THE UNITED
NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION 103, 104–08 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1994); Rex J.
Zedalis, Gulf War Compensation Standard: Concerns Under the Charter, 26 REVUE BELGE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 333, 334 (1993). Some questioned the Security Council’s authority to establish a subsidiary organ that exercises legislative and quasi-judicial powers. Bernhard Graefrath, Iraq: Reparations and the Security Council, 55 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 1, 65
(1995); see also Peter Malanczuk, International Business and New Rules of State Responsibility? The Law Applied by the United Nations (Security Council) Compensation Commission
for Claims Against Iraq, in PERSPECTIVES OF AIR LAW, SPACE LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS LAW FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 117, 128–29 (K. Böckstiegel ed., 1996). But see Hans
van Houtte et al., The United Nations Compensation Commission, in THE HANDBOOK OF
REPARATIONS, supra note 2, at 321, 327 (asserting that “the competence of the Security
Council to establish the UNCC as its subsidiary organ has been accepted by the majority of
scholars”). Finally, some critiqued the UNCC for failing to provide Iraq a meaningful role in
the claims process. See Elyse J. Garmise, The Iraqi Claims Process and the Ghost of Versailles, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 840, 871 (1992); van Houtte et al., supra at 351–52.
162.

Taylor, supra note 92, at 200–01, 213; van Houtte et al., supra note 161, at 335–38.

163.

Taylor, supra note 92, at 198, 214.

164.
See S.C. Res. 692, ¶¶ 6–7, U.N. SCOR, 46th year, U.N. Doc. S/RES/692 (May 20,
1991); van Houtte et al., supra note 161, at 363–64. Funds to pay UNCC awards derived from
the “oil for food” procedure, which authorized Iraq to sell oil to fund its humanitarian needs.
S.C. Res. 986, ¶ 8, U.N. SCOR, 50th year, U.N. Doc. S/RES/986 (Apr. 14, 1995).
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The UNCC provides an especially powerful example of the Security
Council’s capacity to compel the payment of compensation to war victims,
but precedents involving individual states show that they can possess a
similar capacity. In particular, following an armed conflict, stronger states
often have compelled weaker states to participate in claims commissions
through which the stronger state’s claims for war losses are adjudicated.165
Those stronger states additionally or alternatively could have pressed for
criminal prosecutions, but virtually none ever did.166 Their failure to do so
likely stems in part from the fact that most post-war claims commissions
were established before the recent emergence of international criminal
law and thus at a time when there was less expectation that the authors of
mass atrocities would be subject to criminal sanctions. In addition, some of
the conflicts that formed the subject matter of these claims commissions
probably did not feature the kinds of brutal crimes that are being prosecuted in today’s international criminal tribunals. But Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and its repression of Iraqi citizens did. Indeed, at the time the
Security Council established the UNCC to compensate the victims of
Iraq’s criminality, a variety of domestic and international groups—including the United States Senate and the European Community—were lobbying for the creation of an international criminal tribunal to prosecute Iraqi
leaders.167 That those calls went unheeded168 suggests that the international community, like domestic states, often finds it more politically feasible to pursue reparatory measures than criminal justice measures.
The history of claims commissions, and especially the creation of the
UNCC, could be understood to demonstrate the international community’s robust capacity to compensate victims of international crimes. At
the least, these bodies show that the Security Council and individual states
165.
Bederman, supra note 92, at 3; Garmise, supra note 161, at 844. Although many
claims commissions were nominally reciprocal, such that they appeared to envision each
party compensating the other party for its losses, in most cases, only the weaker party compensated the stronger. Bederman, supra note 92, at 3–4.
166.
Of course, after World War I, Allied forces sought both compensation and prosecutions from Germany, Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, arts. 227–28, 231–263, June 28, 1919, 2 Bevans 43 [hereinafter Versailles Treaty], but
did not get either.
167.
See Persian Gulf War Criminals Prosecution Act, S. 253, 102d Cong. (1991); Richard L. Berke, Senate Urges War-Crimes Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1991, at A8; U.N. to
Assess Call for Trial of Iraqi Leader, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1991, at A24; Lawyers Ask Trial
of Hussein Before War Crimes Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1991, at A9. See American Bar
Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security Standing Committee on Environmental Law, Section of International Law and Practice Report to the House of Delegates:
Iraqi War Crimes, 26 INT’L LAWYER 274 (1992); Henry T. King, Jr. The Limitations of Sovereignty from Nuremberg to Sarajevo, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 167, 171 (1994); James S. Robbins, War
Crimes: The Case of Iraq, 18 FLETCHER FORUM WORLD AFF. 45, 54–56 (1994).
168.
In his memoire, former President George H.W. Bush identified a series of serious
difficulties that would have attended any attempt to remove Saddam Hussein from power
while Bush was President. See GEORGE H.W. BUSH & BRENT SCOWCROFT, A WORLD
TRANSFORMED 489 (1998); see also Harry M. Rhea, The United States and International
Criminal Tribunals: An Historical Analysis, 16 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 19, 29 (2009).
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sometimes have the means to compel compensation, particularly where
the offending state possesses a certain level of material resources. But
other factors suggest that this history should not be viewed too optimistically. For one thing, because historical claims commissions typically were
one-sided, they generated reparations for only a subset of war victims.
More importantly, because most of today’s international crimes are committed during non-international armed conflicts, the inter-state victor-vanquished model no longer applies, and the “victors” of today’s conflicts
have less ability and incentive to compel reparations. Of course, if the Security Council wanted to ensure that victims of non-international armed
conflicts were compensated, it could do so, as it did when it created the
UNCC, but the creation of the UNCC was itself unprecedented. Not only
was it the first and only time that the Security Council established a compensation mechanism for the victims of war, but the Security Council did
so only after taking the rare step of authorizing military action against
Iraq.169 Thus, the creation of the UNCC followed an overwhelmingly successful military campaign launched to repel a clear act of aggression. It
was nearly universally accepted that Iraq had breached fundamental
norms of international law, and Iraq itself (reluctantly) accepted liability
for its violations.170 Equally significant was the availability of natural resources to fund the UNCC’s compensation orders. As U.N. diplomat JeanClaude Aime put it, claims against Iraq were brought “because Iraq has
oil. If Iraq didn’t have oil, there would be no claims.”171 Thus, although
the Security Council probably has the power to obtain a great deal of compliance with compensation orders, its past inaction in this realm gives us
reason to fear that it would prove unwilling to use that power, just as it has
been unwilling to assist in the capture of international criminal indictees.
Individual states could assist in enforcing of reparations orders, but
here again we should not expect too much. On the one hand, individual
states and the international community increasingly cooperate to seek the
return of stolen assets. The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), for instance, came into force in 2005, and it delineates
mechanisms for the tracing, freezing, seizing, forfeiture, and return of stolen assets.172 To this same end, in 2007, the World Bank and the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime launched the Stolen Assets Recovery
Initiative (StAR), which is intended “to help developing countries recover
assets stolen by corrupt leaders.”173 StAR has assisted in efforts to recover
169.

See S.C. Res. 678, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990).

170.

See van Houtte et al., supra note 161, at 325, 325 n.13.

171.
Neil King Jr., Battle Plan: Firms World-Wide Seek Billions to Cover Their Gulf
War Losses – A U.N. Panel Is Inundated By Voluminous Claims; Some Just Make No Sense –
Can the Iraqis Pay the Bill?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 1997, at A1.
172.

G.A. Res. 58/4, arts. 51–59, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Oct. 31, 2003).

173.
World Bank and UNODC to Pursue Stolen Asset Recovery, UNODC (Sept. 17,
2007), http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/world-bank-and-unodc-to-pursue-stolen-asset-recovery.html.
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funds stolen from Haiti, Mexico, and Trinidad and Tobago.174 These initiatives show that the international community is aware of the grave damage
wrought by corrupt leaders175 and is increasingly committed to finding
their stolen resources and returning them to their rightful owners. That
increased commitment notwithstanding, obstacles remain. The StAR Initiative frankly acknowledges that “[o]nce stolen funds, whether public or
private, have been transferred abroad, they are extremely difficult to recover.”176 The difficulty stems in part from the fact that many states do
not have non-conviction based asset forfeiture laws, so stolen assets can be
returned only if the leader who stole them is criminally convicted of their
theft.177 Thus, when offenders have died, have fled the jurisdiction, or otherwise have de facto or de jure immunity from prosecution, then no asset
recovery can take place. In addition, developing nations seeking the return
of stolen assets frequently possess only meager financial resources along
with limited legal, investigative, and judicial capacity,178 and these limitations likewise impede their ability to recover their assets.
Efforts to obtain compensation from individuals who commit international crimes have confronted similar obstacles. In the United States, the
Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victims Protection Act allow victims of large-scale human rights abuses to obtain civil judgments against
individual offenders.179 Many have, but virtually none of the prevailing
plaintiffs have been able to enforce their judgments.180 Certainly, if defendants have assets in the United States, then collection is relatively
straightforward,181 but defendants typically remove their assets from the
United States while litigation is pending,182 and attempts even to find
these assets in foreign jurisdictions (let alone to enforce judgments against
them) face tremendous challenges.183 Obtaining and enforcing compensatory judgments against states proves even more difficult, as states are typi174.
See Mark V. Vlasic & Gregory Cooper, Fast Cash: Recovering Assets from Corrupt
Leaders, AM. Q., Fall 2010, at 48.
175.
The World Bank estimates that approximately $20 to $40 billion is stolen from
developing and transitional countries every year. Mark V. Vlasic, Op-Ed., Justice for Haiti,
Via the Swiss, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2010.
176.
THEODORE S. GREENBERG ET AL., STOLEN ASSET RECOVERY (STAR) INITIATIVE,
STOLEN ASSET RECOVERY: A GOOD PRACTICES GUIDE FOR NON-CONVICTION BASED ASSET FORFEITURE 1 (2009).
177.

Id. at 13.

178.

Id. at 1.

179.
Unfortunately for victims, the Supreme Court recently curtailed the reach of the
Alien Tort Claims Act. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 U.S. 1659 (2013).
180.

SHELTON, supra note 88, at 171–72.

181.
For instance, plaintiffs in an Alien Tort Claims Act suit against Carl Dorélien collected nearly $600,000 out of state lottery proceeds that Dorélien had won. Jean v. Dorélien,
Haiti: The High Command and the Raboteau Massacre, CTR. FOR JUSTICE & ACCOUNTABILITY, http://www.cja.org/article.php?list=type&type=78 (last visited Sept. 28, 2014).
182.

SHELTON, supra note 88, at 172.

183.

STEPHENS

ET AL.,

supra note 95, at 536–37.
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cally immune from suit in foreign jurisdictions,184 and even where they are
not, their property is typically immune from process.185
The foregoing analysis suggests that an international reparations body
would confront serious obstacles in enforcing its awards against non-compliant states or individuals. It is true that the Security Council possesses
some enforcement powers, and it is likely that the Council would be more
inclined to use those powers to enforce reparations orders than criminal
indictments. But the fact remains that the Security Council is frequently
paralyzed by a permanent member’s veto, so we can expect frequent Security Council inaction. Other states could help with enforcement, but in
most cases they will have neither the motivation nor the ability to be of
great practical assistance. These caveats notwithstanding, I nonetheless believe that an international reparations body would have greater enforcement success than an international criminal body, primarily by virtue of
the greater likelihood of voluntary compliance with reparations awards.
B. Finding Accurate Facts
My research on fact-finding at international criminal tribunals has
shown the tremendous difficulties involved in establishing the criminal liability of individuals to a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, as that standard has been traditionally defined. Defendants are convicted despite
these difficulties, but I have questioned both the bases for these convictions and the standard of proof actually applied by the tribunals. A body
adjudicating civil reparations claims will almost certainly be a more effective fact-finder, but how much more effective depends on the tasks it is
required to perform. Some reparations bodies, for instance, are asked only
to ascertain the claimants’ entitlement to reparations and the appropriate
quantity of those reparations,186 whereas others also are charged with determining a state’s or an individual’s liability for the acts necessitating
reparations.

184.

See id. at 89.

185.
Id. at 97; see also Andrea K. Bjorklund, Arbitration and National Courts: Conflict
and Cooperation: Sovereign Immunity as a Barrier to the Enforcement of Investor-State Arbitral Awards: The Re-Politicization of International Investment Disputes, 21 AM. REV. INT’L
ARB. 211, 211–12 (2010); Giuliana Cane, The Enforcement of ICSID Awards: Revolutionary
or Ineffective?, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 439, 452 (2004) (discussing the difficulty of satisfying
ICSID awards due to states’ immunity from execution); Susan Choi, Judicial Enforcement of
Arbitration Awards Under ICSID and New York Conventions, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
175, 180–81 (1995–1996) (same).
186.
Rajesh Singh, Raising the Stakes: Evidentiary Issues in Individual Claims Before the
United Nations Compensation Commission, in REDRESSING INJUSTICES THROUGH MASS
CLAIMS PROCESSES 61, 64 (Perm. Ct. Arb. ed., 2006) (observing that the UNCC’s fairly limited task was to decide “whether, given the over-arching state responsibility of Iraq that had
been pre-determined by the Security Council, claimants had, in fact suffered any direct loss
and, if so, the financial extent of that loss”).
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The fact-finding required of bodies that have no jurisdiction to consider questions of liability is fairly straightforward,187 for these bodies
must determine only whether a claimant is entitled to reparations and
what is the appropriate amount of reparations. To be sure, these questions
can be hard to answer, as claimants often find it difficult to gather evidence in the chaos that follows international crimes.188 To meet these challenges, some claims commissions have applied an even “less stringent
standard of proof” than that which typically prevails in civil litigation.189
Others, additionally or alternatively, have redistributed burdens of proof
by requiring respondents to assist in evidence gathering and authorizing
tribunal staff and arbitrators to engage in independent research in order to
substantiate claims.190 Finally, to simplify the valuation of injuries, a few
commissions have used mass claims processing techniques by which certain fixed amounts are paid for certain types of injuries.191 In summary, it
has been common for reparations bodies that adjudicate claimant eligibility and losses to reasonably adapt their fact-finding processes to meet the
challenges confronting claimants, and future, similar bodies can easily do
the same.192
187.
Domestic reparations schemes fall into this category, for they are only established
after the state in question acknowledges its liability. Similarly, in the international context,
the Security Council found Iraq to be liable for all direct losses resulting from its unlawful
invasion and occupation of Kuwait, so the UNCC did not have to pass on Iraq’s liability. S.C.
Res. 687, supra note 159, ¶ 16. Finally, some states are adjudged liable to pay war reparations
by virtue of their launching an aggressive war. See Zedalis, supra note 161, at 334.
188.
John J. Chung, The United Nations Compensation Commission and the Balancing
of Rights between Individual Claimants and the Government of Iraq, 10 U.C.L.A. J. INT’L L.
& FOR. AFF. 141, 153–56 (2005).
189.
Howard M. Holtzmann, Mass Claims, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW, ¶ 16 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2008); Heike Niebergall, Overcoming Evidentiary Weaknesses in Reparation Claims Programmes, in REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF
GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: SYSTEMS IN PLACE AND SYSTEMS IN THE MAKING, supra note 6, at 155; Jacomijn J. van Haersolte-van Hof, Innovations to
Speed Mass Claims: New Standards of Proof, in REDRESSING INJUSTICES THROUGH MASS
CLAIMS PROCESSES, supra note 186, at 13. Rep. of U.N. Compensation Commission, Governing Council, Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning Individual Claims for Serious Personal Injury or Death (Category B Claims), at 34, U.N.
Doc. S/AC.26/1994/1 (May 26, 1994) (citing DURWARD D. SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 22 (Rev. ed. 1975)); Eritrea’s Damages Claims, Eritrea-Ethiopia
Claims Comm’n, 37 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009) (rejecting a heightened standard for damages because it would “often—perhaps almost always—preclude any recovery” and instead deciding
to make the “best estimates possible on the basis of available evidence . . . even if the process
involves estimation, or even guesswork, within the range of possibilities indicated by the
evidence”).
190.

Niebergall, supra note 189, at 151–55.

191.
Id. at 161. For a discussion of the UNCC’s use of mass-claims processing techniques, see van Houtte et al., supra note 161, at 341–59; Veijo Heiskanen, Virtue Out of
Necessity: International Mass Claims and New Uses of Information Technology, in REDRESSING INJUSTICES THROUGH MASS CLAIMS PROCESSES, supra note 186, at 25.
192.
Rep. of U.N. Compensation Commission, Governing Council, Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the First Installment of Individual Claims for Damages up to $100,000 (Category “C” Claims), at 26, 46th Sess., U.N.
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If a reparations body also must determine a respondent’s liability for
the crimes in question, then its fact-finding task becomes more challenging, but it is nonetheless apt to carry out that task more effectively than
the international criminal tribunals can, particularly if it is adjudicating
state responsibility and not individual responsibility. This is because establishing group liability is easier than establishing individual liability. When
a claimant seeks financial compensation from a state for an international
crime, the claimant need only prove that some organ of the state committed the acts in question. Thus, when the ICJ was considering the DRC’s
claim that Uganda had “perpetrated wide-scale massacres” of DRC civilians,193 it was sufficient for the ICJ to conclude that “massive human
rights violations and grave breaches of international humanitarian law
were committed by [the Ugandan military] on the territory of the
DRC.”194 The court did not need “to make findings of fact with regard to
each individual incident alleged” by the DRC,195 and it certainly did not
need to establish which individuals were responsible for any given set of
atrocities. Indeed, the broader conclusion–that the Ugandan military perpetrated grave humanitarian law violations–could be established merely
by reviewing a series of U.N. reports documenting the atrocities. Similarly,
when the IACtHR concludes that a state is responsible for the disappearance of a given individual, it need only find that the individual was abducted by state agents or even that the individual disappeared in the
context of a widespread pattern of disappearances perpetrated by state
agents.196 Indeed, the IACtHR specifically noted that unlike in a criminal
case, the IACtHR need not
determine the perpetrators’ culpability or intentionality in order
to establish that the rights enshrined in the Convention have been
violated, nor is it essential to identify individually the agents to
whom the acts of violation are attributed. The sole requirement is
Doc. S/AC.26/1994/3 (Dec. 21, 1994) (taking into account “the general emergency conditions
prevailing in Kuwait and Iraq under which many thousands of individuals were forced to flee
or hide or were held captive, without safely securing their possessions or retaining documents
that later could be used to substantiate their losses”). See also Rep. of U.N. Compensation
Commission, Governing Council, Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning Individual Claims for Serious Personal Injury or Death (Category
“B” Claims), at 33–34, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1994/1 (May 26, 1994); Rep. of U.N.
Compensation Commission, Governing Council, Report and Recommendations Made by the
Panel of Commissioners Concerning Part I of the First Installment of Individual Claims for
Damages Above $100,000 (Category “D” Claims), at 21, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1998/
1 (Feb. 3, 1998).
193.

DRC v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. 168, at 232, ¶ 183.

194.

Id. at 239, ¶ 207.

195.
Id. at 239, ¶ 205. Similarly, the EECC did “not see its task” as determining liability
“for each individual incident of illegality suggested by the evidence. Rather, it [wa]s to determine liability for serious violations . . . which are usually illegal acts or omissions that were
frequent or pervasive and consequently affected significant numbers of victims.” Prisoners of
War, Eritrea’s Claim, Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Comm’n, 17, ¶ 56 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2003).
196.

See Velásquez-Rodrı́guez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4.
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to demonstrate that the State authorities supported or tolerated
infringement of the rights recognized in the Convention.197
Establishing state responsibility, then, is far easier than establishing
individual criminal responsibility, even if the only basis for that liability is
witness testimony because witnesses are better able to accurately identify
a group of individuals as state soldiers or police agents—based on their
uniforms, weapons, and other circumstances—than to identify a particular
soldier or police agent.
Even a reparations body charged with adjudicating both state and individual liability will sport a fact-finding advantage over the international
criminal tribunals because it will adjudicate civil claims and consequently
can employ a lower standard of proof and more relaxed evidentiary rules
than those in use at the criminal tribunals. Admittedly, bodies adjudicating
civil claims involving large-scale violence have employed more stringent
standards of proof than preponderance-of-the-evidence, but none are as
stringent as the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in use at the international criminal tribunals.198 The Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, for
instance, required facts to be proved by clear and convincing evidence,199
and the IACtHR, similarly, requires claimants to submit evidence “capable of establishing the truth of allegations in a convincing manner.”200 The
ICJ decides many different kinds of claims, and it applies a higher standard when the claims involve “charges of exceptional gravity.” In particular, such claims must be proved by “evidence that is fully conclusive.”201
The ECtHR goes so far as to ostensibly apply a beyond-a-reasonabledoubt standard in some cases,202 but the standard has been resisted by
197.
Paniagua Morales et al. Case, Judgment of May 8, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 37, ¶ 91 (1998).
198.
ICTR Rules of Procedure & Evidence, Rule 87; ICTY Rules of Procedure & Evidence, Rule 87; Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 66. The Special Panels’ procedural rules
failed to specify a standard of proof, but the Panels applied a beyond-a-reasonable-doubtstandard. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Julio Fernandez, UN-ETTA, Case No. 2/2000, Judgment at 9
(Feb. 27, 2001).
199.
Prisoners of War, Eritrea’s Claim, Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Comm’n, 17, ¶¶ 45–46
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2003).
200.
Velásquez-Rodrı́guez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 129. See also Lutz
Oette, Bringing Justice to Victims? Responses of Regional and International Human Rights
Courts and Treaty Bodies to Mass Violations, in REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE,
WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: SYSTEMS IN PLACE AND SYSTEMS IN THE
MAKING, supra note 6, at 217, 229 (noting that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
has “adopted a more flexible standard of proof that takes the nature of the violations into
account”).
201.

Genocide Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 1, ¶ 209.

202.
See Gobind Singh Sethi, The European Court of Human Rights’ Jurisprudence on
Issues of Forced Disappearances, 8 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 29 (2001) (asserting that the ECtHR
effectively applies a lower standard of proof in cases alleging right-to-life violations), available at http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1507&context=hr
brief.
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numerous members of the court203 and criticized by scholars.204 More importantly, some suggest that the ECtHR’s standard cannot “be equated to
the standard applied in criminal proceedings in the common law system.”205 Finally, regardless of the applicable standard of proof, all of these
civil bodies utilize more relaxed evidentiary rules than those governing
evidence at the criminal tribunals, and they consequently allow claimants
to prove their claims primarily through the use of documentary
evidence.206
Given the above precedents, an international reparations body would
almost certainly utilize a lower standard of proof and less rigorous evidentiary rules than those the international criminal tribunals employ. That
fact, in itself, is not indicative of the compensation body’s likely success in
fact-finding, for a standard of proof serves to allocate errors, not ameliorate them. That is, adopting a high standard of proof does not reduce the
number of erroneous decisions that a fact-finder will make207 but rather
allocates the errors in favor of the defendant by making it more likely that
errors will result in acquittals rather than convictions.208 With that fact in
mind, we can see that the international criminal tribunals confront difficulties not because they are incompetent at fact-finding but because they
must employ a standard of proof that ill-fits the evidence they receive.
Specifically, the evidence submitted to prove a defendant’s culpability for
an international crime is frequently so vague, inconsistent, and contradictory that it cannot support a factual finding beyond a reasonable doubt, as
that standard has traditionally been defined. In theory, that fact poses no
problem for an international criminal tribunal for it can simply deter203.
See Labita v. Italy, App. No. 26772/95, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 1 of dissent (Apr. 6, 2000)
(Judges P. Ridruejo, Bonello, Makarczyk, Tulkens, Stránická, Butkevych, Casadevall &
Zupancic, dissenting) Veznedaroglu v. Turkey, App. No. 32357/96, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 1-19
(Apr. 11, 2000) (Bonello, J., dissenting in part).
204.
See PHILIP LEACH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND FACT-FINDING:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE FACT-FINDING MISSIONS CONDUCTED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
AND COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 16 (2009), available at http://www.academia.edu/1315823/
INTERNATIONAL_HUMAN_RIGHTS_and_FACT-FINDING; Sethi, supra note 202, at
30; THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & DINAH SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
AMERICAS: SELECTED PROBLEMS 223 (4th ed. 1995); Loukis Loucaides, Standards of Proof in
Proceedings under the European Convention on Human Rights, in PRÉSENCE DU DROIT PUBLIC ET DES DROITS DE L’HOMME: MÉLANGES OFFERTS À JACQUES VÉLU, 1431, 1431–1443
(Bruylant ed., 1992).
205.
LEACH ET AL., supra note 204, at 16; Jochen A. Frowein, Fact-Finding by the European Commission of Human Rights, in FACT-FINDING BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
237, 248 (Richard Bonnot Lillich ed., 1992).
206.
Christine Van den Wyngaert, International Criminal Courts as Fact (and Truth)
Finders in Post-Conflict Societies: Can Disparities with Ordinary Criminal Courts Be
Avoided?, 100 ASIL PROCEEDINGS 63, 66 (2006).
207.
Indeed, as Erik Lillquist has pointed out, raising the standard of proof can increase
the overall number of errors depending on the ratio of guilty to innocent defendants in the
pool of defendants to be prosecuted. See Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 102 (2002).
208.

COMBS, supra note 47, at 345–46.
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mine—repeatedly—that the prosecution has not met its burden of proof.
Acquitting a large proportion of international criminal defendants gives
rise to other difficulties, however, and perhaps partially as a consequence,
the international criminal tribunals have chosen not to do so. Instead, I
have contended, the tribunals have engaged in a very different form of
fact-finding than that which they publicly acknowledge.209 By contrast, an
international reparations body that applies a lower standard of proof will
have less need to manipulate its fact-finding processes because the evidence it receives will be more likely to meet the lower standard it adopts.
Finally, an international reparations body would not be required to
employ many of the procedural rules that protect defendants’ due process
rights but that undermine accurate fact-finding. As just one example, the
ICJ and human rights courts routinely draw adverse inferences against a
state that fails produce evidence or otherwise does not respond to allegations. For instance, in finding against Honduras in the landmark Velásquez-Rodrı́gues case, the IACtHR observed that “[t]he manner in which
the Government conducted its defense would have sufficed to prove many
of the Commission’s allegations by virtue of the principle that the silence
of the accused or elusive or ambiguous answers on its part may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of the truth of the allegations, so long as the
contrary is not indicated by the record or is not compelled as a matter of
law.”210 Such a principle would be an anathema to the international criminal tribunals, which guarantee the defendants’ right not to testify against
themselves.211 Although that guarantee is clearly appropriate in an international criminal tribunal, it equally clearly impairs the judges’ ability to
find accurate facts.212
III. THE NORMATIVE CASE FOR SHIFTING FOCUS
PROSECUTORIAL TO THE REPARATORY

FROM THE

The foregoing Parts answered affirmatively the question: would the
international community have more success in efforts to compensate victims than it is currently having in its efforts to prosecute offenders? This
answer is important because—so far as I know—the question has never
been either asked or answered. But the answer does not tell us whether
the international community’s relative success in compensatory efforts justifies shifting focus from the prosecutorial to the reparatory. Indeed, as
noted above, this Article assumes for the sake of argument that prioritizing prosecutions is normatively appropriate as an abstract matter. That is,
this Article assumes that if we had our choice, we would prosecute those
209.
Id. at 224–72
210.
Velásquez-Rodrı́guez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 138.
211.
ICTY Statute, supra note 116, at art. 21(4)(g); ICTR Statute, supra note 116, at art.
20(4)(g); Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 67(1)(g); Statute of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, art. 17(4)(g), U.N. Doc. S/2002/246, App. II Attachment, at 29, 39 (Mar. 8, 2002); STL
Statute, supra note 40, art. 16(4)(h).
212.
LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW 158 (2006).
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who commit international crimes because prosecutions advance various
important goals more effectively than any other transitional justice mechanism, including reparations.
Despite those assumptions, this Part suggests that, at this moment in
history, the international community might do well to shift a considerable
portion of its resources to reparatory efforts. First, Section A summarizes
the real and tangible benefits that victims gain from financial reparations
in order to show that, even though we might believe that prosecutions can
better advance the most pressing transitional justice goals, reparations are
also valuable to victims in a host of important ways. In other words,
money spent on reparations may not be money spent in the most advantageous way, but it is unquestionably money well spent. Section B considers
the role that financial inequality plays in generating and sustaining armed
conflict. It seems no coincidence that most recent mass atrocities have occurred in desperately poor countries that not only feature extremely low
income levels but also high rates of inequality between rich and poor. To
the extent that financial reparations can minimize that inequality and raise
economic standards overall, we have reason to hope that they can reduce
the incidence of mass violence.
Finally, Section C details the geo-political skepticism that currently
threatens international criminal law. In particular, Section C observes that
the field is at a reputational low and is currently facing the most robust
challenges of its short existence. We could respond to this troubling state
of affairs by redoubling our efforts to improve the functioning and results
of international criminal tribunals, but this may be a risky strategy, for if it
fails, we are not likely to see renewed efforts at international criminal justice for many decades to come. An arguably safer route would be to temporarily divert some of our energy and resources to financial
reparations—a valuable post-conflict mechanism that we are more likely
to satisfactorily implement. Once the international community has
achieved some success in that less-ambitious endeavor, it might be more
willing to use the power it has to pursue the more ambitious, normatively
desirable endeavor—international criminal trials.
A. The Benefits of Reparations: Victims’ Perspective
So as not to re-tread the literature that already extols reparations,213 I
will here focus primarily on one less-examined aspect: victims’ attitudes
towards reparations. In sum, victims of international crimes both want and
213.
See REPARATIONS: INTERDISCIPLINARY INQUIRIES (Jon Miller & Rahul Kumar
eds., 2007) (praising reparations as a “potent tool for social justice”); Carla Ferstman et al.,
Introduction to REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY: SYSTEMS IN PLACE AND SYSTEMS IN THE MAKING, supra note 6, at 7
(providing a comprehensive examination of reparations in order to advance their “effective
implementation”); de Greiff’s Introduction, supra note 2, at 2 (extolling reparations as “the
most tangible manifestation of the efforts of the state to remedy the harms they have suffered” for many victims).
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expect reparations.214 In a study of Afghan victims, for instance, eightyeight percent expressed the belief that reparations should be awarded to
victims of past crimes.215 Similarly when Ugandans were asked “what
should be done for” the Northern Ugandan victims of armed conflict, the
majority responded that they should be provided with some form of reparations.216 Even more notably, a large-scale study of victim attitudes involving nearly 1000 victims across eleven regions found high levels of
support for reparations through the entire sample. These victims considered monetary compensation to be the most important form of reparations,217 and they valued compensation not only for its capacity to benefit
victims but for the accountability it can impose on offenders.218 For instance, when asked what punishment they considered most appropriate for
offenders, thirty-six percent of victims said imprisonment, but a very close
thirty-four percent said payment of money to victims.219 Victims also see
reparations as an effective way to benefit entire communities, not just
individuals.220
That victims desire reparations should come as no surprise both because most victims of international crimes desperately need financial assistance221 and because reparations benefit victims both tangibly and
intangibly. The world’s most ambitious reparations scheme—that which
Germany implemented to compensate victims of the Nazis—is considered
to have been enormously successful and to have transported many
thousands of refugees from a life “[of] abject poverty [into] a dignified life
214.
Numerous studies that feature direct interviews of victims of mass atrocities show
that reparations are one of their key priorities. EVANS, supra note 2, at 136.
215.

A CALL

FOR

JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 33.

216.

INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE & HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER,
FORGOTTEN VOICES: A POPULATION BASED SURVEY ON ATTITUDES ABOUT PEACE AND JUSTICE IN NORTHERN UGANDA 36 (2005), available at http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJHRC-Uganda-Voices-2005-English.pdf [hereinafter Forgotten Voices]. Whereas fifty-two
percent of respondents said that victims should receive financial compensation only eight
percent said justice, nine percent said apologies, and six percent said reconciliation. Id.
217.

ERNESTO KIZA ET AL., VICTIMS OF WAR: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON WAR-VICTIMIVICTIMS’ ATTITUDES TOWARDS ADDRESSING ATROCITIES 119 (2006).

ZATION AND

218.
Id. at 112. Ugandan victims surveyed in another study likewise “identified compensation as the primary response to harm,” valuing it both for imposing accountability on perpetrators and for improving the material conditions of affected communities. Annual Report
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Reports of the Office of
the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/38/Add.2, at 19, ¶
57 (Jan. 25, 2008).
219.
KIZA, supra note 217, at 112. At the same time, because attitudes varied from
region to region, the authors concluded that “the implementation of reparative measures has
to be adapted to the particular setting of the conflict.” Id. at 121.
220.
See A CALL FOR JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 34; Forgotten Voices, supra note 216, at
36; TRUST FUND FOR VICTIMS, supra note 111, at 36.
221.
ICTJ, UNFULFILLED EXPECTATIONS: VICTIMS’ PERSPECTIVES OF JUSTICE AND
REPARATIONS IN TIMOR-LESTE 12–13 (2010). See KIZA, supra note 217, at 80–90 (discussing
the various impacts of victimization, including loss of income, deprivation, and
displacement).
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with modest security.”222 Latin American victims of enforced disappearances and torture also received crucial help in rebuilding their lives
through their receipt of pension payments, educational supplements, and
medical and psychological assistance.223 Most of the more recent victims
of international crimes live in desperately poor regions, so they are all the
more in need of financial assistance. For example, the ICC’s Trust Fund
for Victims (TFV), which currently works in Uganda and the DRC, has
assisted victims through physical rehabilitation, psychological rehabilitation, and by providing financial support. An evaluation of victims who
have received corrective surgery, prosthetics, and physiotherapy indicates
that this assistance “invariably provided victim survivors with an extensive
degree of physical healing” that enabled them to participate in community-based activities and to resume their productive roles in society.224
Psychological and financial assistance have proven equally valuable. Victims receiving psychological assistance reported adopting a more optimistic outlook and having greater confidence, which enabled them to reengage in community activities and to address their problems in more effective ways.225 The TFV also provides material support for victims who
suffer financial losses due to destruction of property, displacement and,
loss of income-earning family members.226 This financial assistance enabled victims to borrow, save and invest, pay school fees, and afford emergency medical care. Victims reported that these economic gains
contributed significantly to improvements in their mental health and sense
of security,227 and commentators have opined that, for many victims, the
222.
Kurt Schwerin, German Compensation for Victims of Nazi Persecution, 67 NW. U.
L. REV. 479, 522–23 (1972).
223.
Arturu J. Carrillo and Jason S. Palmer, Transnational Mass Claim Processes
(TMCPs) in International Law and Practice, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 343, 359, 407 (2010).
See generally, Guembe, supra note 91, at 25–45 (describing different types of reparations and
different classes of beneficiaries); Lira, supra note 91, at 56.
224.
JENNIFER MCCLEARY-SILLS & STELLA MUSAKA, INT’L CENTER FOR RESEARCH
WOMEN, EXTERNAL EVALUATION OF THE TRUST FUND FOR VICTIMS PROGRAMMES IN
NORTHERN UGANDA AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: TOWARDS A PERSPECTIVE OF UPCOMING INTERVENTIONS 24–25 (2013), http://www.icrw.org/sites/default/files/publications/ICRW%20TFV%20%20Evaluation%20Report_0.pdf [hereinafter EXTERNAL
EVALUATION]. After receiving physical rehabilitation, many victims reported that they were
able “to live a normal life again, to make plans for the future, to resume school and gardening, the confidence to participate in community gatherings again, social independence and
self-reliance.” Id. at 25.
ON

225.
Id. at 28–29; VICTIMS’ RIGHTS WORKING GROUP, THE IMPACT OF THE ROME
STATUTE SYSTEM ON VICTIMS AND AFFECTED COMMUNITIES 19 (2010) (noting that “[t]he
implementation of the activities funded by Trust Fund for victims of the ICC developed hope,
trust, confidence and a sense of belonging by the victims,” and that “[f]amilies and communities appreciated the projects because they brought both psychosocial and physical healing”)
[hereinafter IMPACT ROME STATUTE].
226.
227.

EXTERNAL EVALUATION, supra note 224, at 31.

Id. at 8. See also THE TRUST FUND FOR VICTIMS, LEARNING
SECOND MANDATE: FROM IMPLEMENTING REHABILITATION ASSISTANCE
17 (2010).
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TFV’s material assistance is likely “the most tangible impact” they experience from the ICC.228
Less well known are the intangible benefits that victims gain through
reparations, but these can be equally important. Offender-derived reparations frequently provide victims with the satisfaction of seeing the offender
“paying back” what the victim had lost,229 and they can help deter future
violations230 and promote reconciliation.231 Moreover, reparations from
any source serve as a vital acknowledgement of the injustice the victim has
suffered.232 As Brandon Hamber puts it: “[F]inancial reparations have the
potential to play an important role in any process of healing, coping with
bereavement, and addressing the impact of violence for victims. They can
symbolically acknowledge and recognize the individual’s suffering.”233
Yael Danieli agrees, noting that reparations “concretise[ ] for the victim . . .
[that] he is not guilty, and somebody cares about it. . . . Just a letter of
apology doesn’t have the same meaning and even if it is a token it
adds.”234 Finally, the process through which victims gain reparations often
allows them to exercise autonomy and thereby to “remedy the powerlessness and subjugation they may have suffered” during the conflict.235
B. Reducing Conflict Through Reparations
For decades, social scientists have sought to isolate the factors and
conditions that lead to mass violence. Therefore, scholars have considered,
among other topics, the relationship between large-scale violence and a
state’s ethnic makeup,236 its form of government,237 and the cultural and
228.

IMPACT ROME STATUTE, supra note 225, at 19.

229.

KIZA, supra note 217, at 65.

230.
For instance, Nowak and McArthur opine that “[i]f states provided effective remedies ensuring that the individual perpetrators are held accountable to pay all the costs of
long-term rehabilitation for torture victims, this would probably have a stronger deterrent
effect than criminal punishments.” MANFRED NOWAK & ELIZABETH MCARTHUR, THE
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A COMMENTARY 483 (2008).
231.
See Pascale Chifflet, The Role and Status of the Victim, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMILAW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE LAW OF THE ICTY 75, 98 (Gideon Boas & William
Schabas eds., 2003); Roy L. Brooks, Getting Reparations for Slavery Right – A Response to
Posner and Vermeule, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 251, 275 (2004).
NAL

232.

KIZA, supra note 217, at 65; see also IMPACT ROME STATUTE, supra note 225, at 19.

233.

Hamber, supra note 105, at 566.

234.

Danieli, supra note 6, at 60.

235.
Carlton Waterhouse, The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly: Moral Agency and the
Role of Victims in Reparations Programs, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 257, 261 (2009).
236.
See, e.g., Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, On Economic Causes of Civil War, 50
OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 563 (1998).
237.

See, e.g., R.J. RUMMEL, POWER KILLS: DEMOCRACY AS A METHOD OF NONVI(1997) (arguing that democracy can act as a practical solution to end war and all
other collective political regime violence); William Easterly et al., Development, Democracy,
and Mass Killings, 11 J. ECON. GROWTH 129 (2006) (analyzing the causal effect between
democracy and GDP and mass killing).
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individual features that characterize it.238 Further, and most relevantly to
this discussion, social scientists have also explored whether a state’s economic status can help to predict whether it will descend into violence; not
surprisingly, they have found that it can. In particular, studies show a negative correlation between a state’s economic development and the likelihood of mass killings occurring therein.239 In addition, research shows a
strong relationship between inequality and mass atrocities. The earliest
studies centered on inequality in land distribution and showed that such
inequality correlated with political violence.240 Later studies revealed that
unequal land distribution was only indirectly correlated with political violence; rather, “the more important direct cause in the variation in rates of
political violence . . . is inequality in the distribution of income,” of which
maldistribution of land can be a component.241
Providing financial assistance, job training, and other services to affected individuals and communities can help to eliminate some of the underlying causes of mass atrocities by raising income levels, either across
the board, or in a way that ameliorates some of the state’s underlying inequalities. To be sure, post-conflict reparations will never be so generous as
to dramatically alter a state’s overall income levels. Nor will reparations
necessarily reduce inequality, because the reparations may not be provided to those with the lowest incomes. But given the recent prevalence of
mass atrocities in desperately impoverished states featuring unequal income distributions,242 we can expect reparations to reduce to some degree
the mass-atrocity risk factors described above. Certainly, they will have
some effect on these risk factors whereas prosecutions, which provide no
financial assistance to victims or their communities, have none.
C. Shifting to Save: The Precarious Present Position of
International Criminal Justice
Because reparations offer many benefits, they would constitute a desirable post-conflict response regardless of the international community’s
238.
See ERVIN STAUB, THE ROOTS OF EVIL: THE ORIGINS OF GENOCIDE AND OTHER
GROUP VIOLENCE 51–66 (1989) (describing the influence of culture and individual characteristics, such as cultural self-concept, self-esteem, and world view, as well as moral value orientation and unconscious motivations on the occurrence of genocide and mass killings).
239.
Easterly et al., supra note 237, at 141. See generally DOUGLAS A. HIBBS, JR., MASS
POLITICAL VIOLENCE: A CROSS NATIONAL CAUSAL ANALYSIS 188 (1973) (finding that economic development tends to decrease levels of violence).
240.
See generally Bruce M. Russett, Inequality and Instability: The Relation of Land
Tenure to Politics, 16 WORLD POL. 442, 449 (1964) (noting that inequality of land distribution
bears a relation to political instability); Raymond Tanter & Manus I. Midlarsky, A Theory of
Revolution, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 264, 277 (1967) (indicating that revolutions occurred in
those societies with a higher degree of income inequality).
241.
Edward N. Muller & Mitchell A. Seligson, Inequality and Insurgency, 81 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 425, 427, 443 (1987).
242.
Countries such as Rwanda, DRC, Central African Republic and Uganda have relatively sharp income inequality. See WORLD BANK, GINI INDEX, http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/SI.POV.GINI.
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capacity to satisfactorily carry out criminal prosecutions. But this section
suggests that reparations may stand as a particularly valuable alternative
to criminal trials—at this point in time—precisely because—at this point
in time—international criminal justice is foundering.
It is no exaggeration to say that international criminal law is at an alltime reputational low. The ICTY—long considered the crown jewel of the
international tribunals—has recently suffered a series of reputational
blows involving controversial acquittals,243 allegations of undue influence
exerted by the United States and Israel,244 the high-profile disqualification
of a judge just six weeks before his Chamber was to issue its judgment in
an extraordinarily long-running case,245 and the continuation of the case
with a new judge,246 in arguable contravention of ICTY rules.247 Most of
the hybrid tribunals have also faced debilitating challenges. The Special
Court for Sierra Leone stands as a bright star in this constellation, but the
other hybrid tribunals have either been deemed failures or are well their
way to being so deemed. Starved for resources and lacking the most basic
support from the international community, the Special Panels for Serious
Crimes was consigned to prosecute only low-level Timorese militiamen in
proceedings that frequently ignored due process standards.248 Inadequate
and unstable funding likewise substantially impedes the ECCC,249 which
also must contend with a host-government—Cambodia—that interferes
with its proceedings and is dead-set against future prosecutions despite
their justification.250 Consequently, the ECCC will probably end its life
243.
See Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Simatović, Case No. IT-03-69-T, Judgement (Int’l
Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia May 30, 2013); Prosecutor v. Gotovina & Markaè,
Case No. IT-06-90-A, Judgement (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2012);
Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgement (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013).
244.
See E-mail from Frederik Harhoff, Judge, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, to multiple recipients (June 6, 2013), available at http://www.bt.dk/sites/default/files-dk/
node-files/511/6/6511917-letter-english.pdf.
245.
Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Decision on Defence Motion for Disqualification of Judge Frederik Harhoff and Report to the Vice President (Int’l Crim. Trib.
For the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 28, 2013).
246.
Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Order Assigning a Judge Pursuant to
Rule 15 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 31, 2013); Prosecutor v. Šešelj,
Case No. IT-03-67-T, Decision on Continuation of Proceedings (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 13, 2013).
247.
See Kevin Jon Heller, The Final Nail in the ICTY’s Coffin, OPINIO JURIS (Dec. 16,
2013, 6:37 AM), http://opiniojuris.org; Megan Fairlie, W(h)ither now the reputation of the
ICTY?, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 1, 2014, 12:20 PM), http://opiniojuris.org.
248.
See generally David Cohen, Indifference and Accountability: The United Nations
and the Politics of International Justice in East Timor, E.–W. CENTER SPECIAL REPTS., No. 9,
June 2006, at 1–4.
249.
See Colin Meyn, Unpaid National Staff at KR Tribunal Strike for a Second Time,
THE CAMBODIA DAILY, Sept. 2, 2013, available at https://www.cambodiadaily.com/archives/
unpaid-national-staff-at-kr-tribunal-strike-for-second-time-41547/.
250.
See generally INT’L BAR ASS’N, THE ECCC – A FAILURE
12, available at http://jurist.org/paperchase/Cambodia-1.pdf.
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having prosecuted a measly three individuals. As for the STL, it has had to
resort to a questionable procedural device—the trial in absentia—even to
begin prosecutions.251 Thus, no matter how closely STL trials adhere to
other due process norms, they will inevitably be considered largely illegitimate due to the defendants’ absence from trial.
Most importantly, the fact-finding and enforcement challenges summarily described in Part I are reaching a crisis point at the ICC—the institution that stands as the future of international criminal justice. Part I
revealed that the ICC has not obtained custody over more than half of its
indictees, but that statistic tells only part of the story. Equally concerning
for the future of the ICC is the battle it is currently losing to prosecute
Kenya’s sitting President, Uhuru Kenyatta and Vice President, William
Ruto. Indicted before they were elected to their current political offices,
Kenyatta and Ruto have used every means at their disposal to obstruct the
ICC’s efforts to prosecute them. Kenyatta not only has refused to turn
over key financial documents,252 but evidence suggests that he and his associates both intimidated and bribed witnesses to induce them to withdraw
from testifying.253 Numerous witnesses have done just that,254 and the
ICC’s case against Kenyatta is in shambles. In December 2013, the ICC
Prosecutor had to ask for another trial postponement, acknowledging
that–due to the many witness withdrawals–she had “insufficient evidence
to proceed to trial.”255 The court gave her more time;256 however, most
commentators, including the Prosecutor herself, believe that the ICC “has

251.
Ian Black, Lebanon ‘Must Boost Efforts to Arrest Hariri Assassination Accused’,
THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 10, 2014, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/10/
lebanon-arrest-hariri-assassination-accused-trial-prosecutor.
252.
See Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Prosecution Application
for a Finding of Noncompliance Pursuant to Article 87(7) against the Government of Kenya
(Dec. 2, 2013).
253.
See Nicholas Kulish & Marlise Simons, Setbacks Rise in Prosecuting the President
of Kenya, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/20/world/
africa/dwindling-witness-list-threatens-case-against-kenyan-president.html?pagewanted=all&
_r=0 (discussing allegations of intimidation). As for bribery, the ICC recently issued an arrest
warrant against Kenyan journalist, Walter Barasa, accusing him of “corruptly influencing”
witnesses to refuse to testify for the prosecution. Prosecutor v. Barasa, Case No. ICC-09-01/
13, Warrant of Arrest for Walter Osapiri Barasa (Aug. 2, 2013).
254.
Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Prosecution Notification of
Withdrawal of Witnesses (July 16, 2013); Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11,
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no realistic chance of successfully prosecuting” Kenyatta unless Kenya
stops its obstructionist tactics.257
Kenyatta has not confined those obstructionist tactics to his own case
or his own country. Rather, he has marshaled the assistance of the AU,
which as discussed above, was already critical of the ICC’s focus on Africa.
Following Kenyatta’s appeal, in October 2013, the AU increased its opposition to the court by adopting a resolution calling for immunity from ICC
jurisdiction for any sitting AU head of state.258 Although this extreme demand has not been met,259 the ICC’s Assembly of States Parties did capitulate to Kenyatta’s and Ruto’s desire not to be present at their trials. After
the ICC’s Appeals Chamber refused to excuse Ruto (and by implication
Kenyatta) from his obligation to attend trial,260 the Assembly of States’
Parties amended the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence to permit the
absence of an accused “who is mandated to fulfill extraordinary public
duties at the highest national level.”261 The failure of these defendants to
attend trial almost certainly will impede later efforts to incarcerate them
(should they be convicted), and for the present, it sends yet another message to the ICC that it lacks the international community’s support.
The witness credibility issues that Part I summarized have also
reached crisis proportions at the ICC. My earlier research on international
criminal fact-finding, which centered on the ICTR, SCSL, and Special
Panels, drew conclusions that were worrisome enough. Even a cursory examination of ICC proceedings, however, suggests that the problem is all
the more devastating there. The ICC’s first trial, in the Lubanga case, featured witness after witness who was later judged to be lying or otherwise
not credible.262 Witness testimony proved even more problematic in the
ICC’s second case, for there the Trial Chamber had to acquit the defendant, Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, because the prosecution’s three key witnesses were not credible and could not be relied upon.263 Witness
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testimony in the Bemba case, moreover, is looking no better. The court
recently issued an arrest warrant for the defendant—Jean-Pierre Bemba—
along with his lawyer and two others, charging them with witness tampering and presenting false testimony. According to the judge issuing the warrant, the prosecution submitted “a remarkable quantity” of evidence,”
including money transfer receipts, telephone call records and transcripts,
text messages and emails, all of which left the judge “firmly satisfied” that
the defendants were engaged in a criminal scheme that consisted of
presenting false and forged documents, coaching witnesses to give false
testimony, and transferring money to witnesses.264 Finally, even in a trial
that has not yet begun—in the Kenyatta case—witnesses have confessed to
lying in their initial statements to the prosecution.265
The difficulties just described have left the ICC—and international
criminal justice—reeling. Some commentators now portray the court as an
institution in crisis,266 and international criminal justice as a field that may
have a shorter-than-expected life span.267 These doom-and-gloom forecasts may be overstated; moreover, even if they are accurate, the path forward is not self-evidently clear.
One response would be to dramatically increase our efforts to bolster,
strengthen, and legitimize international criminal justice so as to ensure its
continued viability. That is, we might believe that, if the efforts we have
put forth thus far have not been sufficient to create a functioning international criminal justice system, then we must re-double those efforts until
we have in fact created a credible and legitimate system about which we
can be proud. That could be a reasonable course of action and one that I
firmly support, but because it is hard to have confidence that efforts will
be re-doubled or that substantial improvements will be realized even if
they are, I tentatively put forth an alternative–and somewhat counterintuitive–path for advancing international criminal justice. Namely, I suggest
that the most efficacious way to preserve the international criminal justice
system may be temporarily to minimize it, dial back our expectations for
it, and re-focus our primary energy and resources on implementing a postconflict mechanism that we can more efficaciously implement.
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Why might I think that reducing the scope of and expectations for the
international criminal justice system will help ultimately to preserve it?
For one thing, the stunning ambition inherent in the current international
criminal justice system indicates that it is an idea that came too soon. Seventy years ago, before the creation of the Nuremberg Tribunal, international criminal justice did not exist. That is, for the several millennia of
human history prior to 1946, there was no expectation that the perpetration of mass atrocities would be followed by criminal sanctions. A hope for
such an expectation began to emerge following World War I, when Allies
sought to prosecute Kaiser Wilhelm and other German war criminals,268
but the utter failure of those efforts showed that the world was not yet
ready for them.
The Nuremberg Trial, then, stood as a watershed moment, but even it
was hopelessly inadequate by today’s standards. Its eleven skeletal procedural rules do not come close to providing the kind of due process that we
now consider essential.269 Its prosecution of aggression and crimes against
humanity violated the principle of nullem crimen sine lege,270 and most
importantly, its jurisdictional provisions excluded the Allies from prosecution.271 In fact, not only did the drafters of the Nuremberg Charter exclude the Allies from prosecution, they did so reflexively and
unquestioningly. Admittedly, some contemporaneous commentators criticized the Tribunal for dispensing “victor’s justice,”272 but they assumed
that the remedy for that violation was abandoning the international criminal justice project, not prosecuting a more balanced group of offenders.
Indeed, the very idea that the Allies would subject themselves to international criminal prosecutions along with the Germans and Japanese would
have been nothing short of unthinkable.273
Yet, fifty short years later, when the ICTY opened its doors, the unthinkable had become the expected. Victors’ justice was by then an anathema; justice, if it was to be considered justice, must be even-handed,
apolitical, and unbiased. Applying those new and improved expectations,
we castigated the states of the former Yugoslavia when they refused to
surrender their indicted political and military leaders to the ICTY.274 We
268.

Versailles Treaty, supra note 166, arts. 227–28.

269.
See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
408 (2003); Gerry J. Simpson, War Crimes: A Critical Introduction, in THE LAW OF WAR
CRIMES 1, 11–16 (Timothy L.H. McCormack & Gerry J. Simpson eds., 1997).
270.

See DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 349–52 (1994).

271.
See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis Powers, art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 54 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280.
272.
Herbert Weschler, The Issues of the Nuremberg Trial, 62 POL. SCI. Q. 11 (1947)
(critically analyzing the Nuremberg trial as dispensing “victor’s justice”).
273.
LUBAN, supra note 270, at 361 (“[O]f course it is absurd to imagine that the victorious Allies would have tried their own heads of state.”).
274.
See Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Problems, Obstacles and Achievements of the ICTY,
2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 558, 564 (2004).

Winter 2015]

From Prosecutorial to Reparatory Justice

273

condemn Rwanda for obstructing ICTR prosecutions of RPF soldiers,275
Indonesia for sheltering Special Panels indictees,276 and Cambodia for
protecting aging Khmer Rouge leaders from near-death prosecutions.277
And we find it reasonable to expect that political leaders, such as Omar al
Bashir and Uhuru Kenyatta, who allegedly obtained or retained power
through the perpetration of brutal crimes against humanity, will voluntarily surrender themselves to a toothless international court—just because
it asks them to.
Although I may appear to scoff at these expectations, I hold them
myself. I agree wholeheartedly that if “justice” is to prove worthy of its
dictionary definition, then it must be applied in a non-self-interested, nondiscriminatory, even-handed way. But desiring justice is not the same as
achieving it, and failing to recognize the extraordinary ambition inherent
in the current international criminal justice is dangerous. Mirjan Damas̆ka
observes that the “endogenous powerlessness of international criminal
courts and the special difficulties they face” would lead one to expect their
ambitions “to be rather modest. In fact, however, they are almost grandiose.”278 Ambitious, even “grandiose,” aims can be appropriate, even desirable, but not where the opportunity costs of pursuing them grow too
high; and certainly not where their failure to be achieved threatens the
continued existence of the system as a whole.
In some sense, my argument boils down to this: in making criminal
prosecutions its centerpiece response to mass atrocities, the international
community may have bitten off more than it can chew. Seemingly in one
bold step, we leapt from a world in which the international community did
not even consider imposing criminal sanctions following mass atrocities to
a world in which the international community is expected to impose criminal sanctions wherever they are appropriate, and regardless of the geopolitical standing of the state or individual involved. The international
community made that leap, but because its reach so vastly exceeded its
grasp, it now finds itself presiding over a criminal justice system that it is
not able satisfactorily to implement and that may be in danger of imploding. For that reason alone, retrenchment should be considered. To be sure,
once such bold steps have been taken, retrenchment can look like defeat,
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vance other fundamental goals may offer the best hope of preserving—for
future attainment—the goals that we are unable to reach today.
As is evident from the preceding pages, the retrenchment that I have
in mind involves shifting some of our focus from the (probably too ambitious) prosecutorial to the (probably more realistic) reparatory. Interestingly, certain historical precedents suggest that the international
community may have done better to emphasize civil reparations over
criminal prosecutions in the first place. In particular, before the thirteenth
century, in both England and on the Continent, criminal acts did not give
rise to criminal sanctions; they instead gave rise to civil compensatory obligations. That is, before the thirteenth century, a murderer was not sentenced to prison or the gallows but rather was required to make a
compensation payment–a wergild–to the victims’ family.279 These compensation payments were designed to eliminate the need for blood feuds
that otherwise would have erupted between the families and tribes of victims and the families and tribes of perpetrators. Although compensation
payments were clear improvements over blood feuds, they were by no
means an optimal response to criminal activity. But at that point in history,
“the kings were too weak to centralize the control of judicial functions in
their own hands”280 and as such, they also were too weak to gain custody
over offenders and impose criminal sanctions thereon. Later, when King
Henry II gained control over the government from the feudal lords and
concomitantly gained control over the administration of justice, there followed “a strong shift away from Anglo-Saxon feud and wergild to Angevin
public prosecution”281 and from “predominantly private prosecution
through monetary compensation to predominantly capital punishment at
the hands of the crown.”282 As Clarence Jeffrey put it:
The king was now a territorial king and his peace extended
throughout the land. . . . He had jurisdiction in every case. The
State, and not the family or the lord, now was the proper prosecutor in every case.283
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Thus, by the end of King Henry II’s reign, the old tribal system had
been replaced by a strong centralized court that was beginning to make
rules for all of England.284
Though the analogy is by no means perfect, the development of domestic criminal law enforcement is suggestive of a similar evolution that
may take place in the context of international criminal law. In particular,
whereas medieval victims had to content themselves with compensation
payments because medieval authorities did not possess the kind of robust,
centralized power that would enable them to obtain custody over offenders and impose criminal sanctions thereon, modern victims of international
crimes find themselves similarly placed. Because, at present, the international community lacks the power to apprehend and prosecute many international criminals, compensation awards may stand as the most efficacious
and realistic response that victims can hope for. Moreover, just as domestic control grew and became more centralized over time, international law
has been gaining in power and influence, particularly in the twentieth century, as the Westphalian paradigm has declined, and as international law
has extended its reach and influence both inter-state and over a variety of
non-state actors and intrastate situations.285 Thus, although much of this
Article has called attention to the international community’s relative
powerlessness and inefficacy, the rapid growth in international law during
the twentieth century can give us hope that any international criminal retrenchment that may take place will be short-lived and that the international community soon will possess sufficient influence and authority to be
able to implement the international criminal justice project in the way that
it should be implemented.
CONCLUSION
When in 1872, Gustav Moynier, the first President of the International
Committee of the Red Cross, proposed the creation of an international
criminal tribunal to prosecute those who committed war crimes, he also
suggested that it be authorized to provide compensation for victims.286
Both proposals were shocking for their day, and neither garnered support.
But, as Bottigliero observes, whereas “the notion of individual criminal
responsibility for grave violations of human rights and humanitarian law
developed over the years and gained legal specificity and support, States
did not grant similar recognition to the ancillary idea of compensating victims of crimes under international law by way of an international mechanism.”287 As a consequence, the international community constructed a
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legally sophisticated international criminal justice system and ignored reparations almost entirely.288 That might be a normatively appropriate path,
for resources are always limited, and we might reasonably expect that the
benefits to be derived from a well-functioning criminal justice system will
far exceed the benefits to be derived from a well-functioning financial reparations system. But no matter how reasonable that abstract calculation
might have been, in practice, we got it backwards. We got it backwards
because we failed to consider our (in)capacity to implement a well-functioning international criminal justice system at this point in time. In fact,
our legally sophisticated international criminal justice system barely functions in the real world, and if its downward trajectory continues, it soon
may no longer exist in the real world.
Although a shift of focus to the reparatory may represent international criminal law’s best hope for continued survival, I nonetheless find it
difficult to advocate. When modern international criminal justice burst
onto the scene in the 1990s, it was welcomed exuberantly and wholeheartedly. International criminal law was seen as ushering in a new era of fairness and accountability, and era in which violence would be reduced,
formerly warring peoples would be reconciled, and world would become a
safer and more just place.289 Although two decades later, most commentators retain little of that early, starry-eyed enthusiasm, advocating a largescale change of focus away from criminal justice can appear to smack of
failure and capitulation. However, in other legal contexts, it has been advised that ambitious goals are more readily reached via a series of small,
measured steps than via a few bold leaps.290 Thus, although the international community leapt into international criminal justice with the best of
intentions, the grave challenges that it currently faces should convince us
to backtrack, retrench and start stepping slowly.
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